

the *ALTERNATIVE:* ***AN AMERICAN SPECTATOR***



Alexander M. Bickel

by Robert H. Bork

A Beleaguered Tory

by George Nash

Wattenberg's America

by Karl O'Lessker

Great Reform Act of 1974

by Marc E. Plattner

Also:

George Carey

Peter Hughes

Benjamin Stein

April 1975

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The Continuing Crisis

■ The Liar of the Month Award is hereby conferred on Senator Stuart Symington, from the great state of Missouri; Mr. Walter J. Dilbeck Jr., the Aristotle Onassis of Evansville, Indiana; and the entire U.S. Senate's Select Committee on Human Nutrition and Needs.

■ After enthralling naive reporters for months with gorgeous tales about his lucrative partnership with Mr. Spiro T. Agnew, Mr. Dilbeck awoke one February morn to hear that Mr. Agnew had made public a letter remonstrating with Mr. Dilbeck because, "you and I know...we have yet to collect together our first dollar," and dissolving the partnership.

■ Meanwhile back in Washington, the vegetant greenhouse for so many of America's most estimable liars, Senator Stuart Symington insisted that he must, as he so grandly put it, "study" the doctoral thesis of a Dr. John F. Lehman, Ph.D. before passing judgment on Dr. Lehman's fitness to serve on the Arms Control Commission. The thesis, "The Roles of Congress and The Executive in Formulating National Security Policy," is over 500 pages long, more than Senator Symington has read since that far-off time when he first harangued Missouri's dirty-necked element into sending him to Washington.

■ Nevertheless Senator Symington's overnight conversion to the life of the mind was but a guppy compared to the whopper reeled in by the Senate's Select Committee on Human Nutrition and Resources. For months compassionate Americans have been aghast at the Committee's revelation that many needy Americans subsist on nothing more than your basic pet food. In fact the story has sent a chill of shame through influential sectors of what Senator McGovern calls his constituency of conscience, and many of them were actually planning to exchange their pure-bred dogs for white Appalachians or some other species of impoverished Americano. But now come indignant words from Dr. Robert H. Wilbur of the Pet Food Institute, who writes in the February 3, issue of the *Journal of the American Medical Association* that the story is without substantiation, that "no evidence other than anecdotal, appears to exist." Yes but from such anecdotes vast boondoggles do grow, Dr. Wilbur!

■ In New York the suspicions of thousands of thoughtful Americans were confirmed regarding Mr. Stewart Mott, General Motors heir and multimillionaire radical, when his landlord declared him "an absolute and negligent nuisance" in a suit attempting to prevent him from operating a chicken farm on the terrace of his fourteenth floor penthouse. As if Americans needed any more proof that theirs is a society that dehumanizes its noblest spirits, that aggrieved young Californian who has been slashing the throats of winos in Los Angeles fell upon his ninth victim on February 5, in another desperate attempt to tell us that there is something terribly wrong with America. The cogency of peaceful protest was once again borne out, this time in the face of ferocious threats and the massed artillery of the

Wisconsin National Guard, when a peace-loving band of swindlers calling themselves Menominee Indians absconded with the title to a sixty-four-room, 237-acre Catholic Novitiate in Gresham, Wisconsin; after spending almost two months squatting Gandhi-like within the novitiate, armed only with their simple faith and a few aging shot guns, automatic weapons, grenades, Molotov cocktails, knives, and other accoutrements of symbolic protest.

■ President Gerald R. (Jerry) Ford heaved up a \$349-billion budget, \$52 billion of which will have to come from sources as yet arcane and possibly even nonexistent. Senator Mike Gravel introduced Senate Resolution 64 "to increase public awareness of transcendental meditation." And in Lake Ronkonkoma, Long Island seventy-one cases of Bon Vivant soup are fighting for their lives. The United States Attorney's office filed suit in Brooklyn's Federal Court to seize and condemn them as suspected carriers of botulism.

■ Industry's year-end profits have been published and reports from the oil industry were auspicious; their profits were notably less "obscene" than last year. In fact Gulf Oil's profits dropped 20 percent in the fourth quarter and Sun Oil's slid 28 percent, but, curious as it may sound, there were no stirring testimonials from politicians, no awards for public service from Common Cause, Inc., not even a kiss on the cheek from Bella Abzug, M.C.

■ Still the constituency of conscience did receive some sanguine tidings. Senator Barry Goldwater, the scourge of modernity, essayed the 94th Congress as "probably the most dangerous the country has ever had." The ferocious Lon Nol regime seemed to be wobbling, and the aforementioned deliberative body appeared disinclined to acquiesce in Mr. Ford's request for increased military aid either to it or to the enemies of communism in South Vietnam. Finally there came evidence that political activism may again be luring the noble passions of America's youthful idealists. A bomb went off in the State Department.

■ To the saga of American higher education another prodigious chapter is about to be added. The campus chautauqua circuit, a speakers' bonanza that has recently served up such challenging intellects as Mr. Evil Knivel, Mr. Clifford Irving, Mr. Huey Newton, Grand Dragon Robert Shelton, a Mr. Buffalo Bill, and the co-star of the long-defunct TV series "Superman," is about to add the illustrious names of Mr. John Dean, Mr. Jeb Stuart Magruder, Mr. Egil Krogh, and of course Mr. Ronald Ziegler, the foreign language expert. Thus to the regular fare of informative Eastern mystics, leftist militants, necromancers, phrenologists, and career busybodies, will be added a host of professional Mary Magdalenes.

■ President Idi Amin notified Queen Elizabeth II that he would be visiting her on August 4, thus affording ample time to help you arrange all that is required for my comfortable

stay in your country," and on February 12, the Queen duly asked Parliament to approve a \$1 million increase in her allowance for maintaining the royal household. What is more there was almost an immediate upheaval in the Tory Party which sent Mr. Edward Heath to the showers and ushered in a new party leader who could be a profound embarrassment to the editors of *Ms.* magazine. The new party leader is Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, and so conservative is she that she inspired visions of a British Barry Goldwater in the *New York Times*—a dark moment indeed for the women of the fevered brow!

■ The noncommunist world's principal oil importers agreed to limit their importation of crude oil, a diplomatic *démarche* that may render their oil suppliers at OPEC more reasonable, but will set no useful precedent for the progressive nations of Eastern Europe. They receive oil from their socialist brethren of the USSR, and in February the Russians raised crude oil prices from 16 to 36 rubles per ton, rubles being the world's monetary buffoon in all money markets save those protected by the benevolent Red Army.

■ Thanks to an ingenious act of Congress, now both sides in the Greek-Turkish imbroglio are incensed with the United States. Early in the month we cut off military aid to the Turkish hordes, presumably to ingratiate the Greeks who have withdrawn their military forces from NATO. Now the Turks are suggesting we vacate air bases on Turkish soil. Consumer lobbyists can rest assured that no more tainted victuals will be served by International Inflight Catering, the food service that prepared meals for those 144 Japan Air Lines passengers who suffered food poisoning early in February. On February 9, Mr. Kenji Kuwabara, the executive in charge of the meal, shot himself. Another example of Arab peacefulness came in February when Arabs blacklisted banking interests with Jewish connections.

■ According to a recently drafted animal control ordinance in Arvada, California, if a stray pet picked up by the city is not claimed by its owner within twenty-four hours, the owner will be destroyed; and in Houston Mayor Fred Hofheinz captured the spirit of the age when he proclaimed, "We're going to offer police jobs to qualified women regardless of their sex." Finally let us pause to offer our congratulations to the visionary whores of Marseilles, France who were maintaining a brothel for senior citizens before the gendarmerie closed it down and arrested two women of delights in their fifties and eight clients between the ages of sixty and seventy-seven.

■ But in the end let us not forget the star center of the 1934 University of Michigan football team, who is even now stalking the country campaigning for his economic program and upbraiding the 94th Congress for its procrastinations; he seems to be moving them to action. On February 13, the Senate took just eighteen seconds to adjourn and the House accomplished same in sixteen minutes. □

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Alexander M. Bickel 1924-1974

The civilized minority has been making heavy weather of it these last few years, and at such times it is all the more important that we pause to reflect on the passing of a man who was capable of defining the world as it is without ever losing his vision of what it should be. Last November 8, Alexander M. Bickel died—as he had lived—in dignity; and no words of our own can honor him so well as these delivered by his friend and colleague, Robert H. Bork, during memorial services at the Yale Law School, where Mr. Bickel had been professor.

—RET

Alex Bickel's gifts were so great and so many that we would have envied him if we had not loved him. For years we knew that he was an extraordinary man. But the warm haze of personal friendship and the diversions of collegialship obscured at first what gradually became clear—that he can be called, without hesitation or embarrassment, a great man.

It would be enough perhaps that Alex was a magnificent legal scholar, but his talents ranged much farther. He moved with distinction into history, journalism, courtroom argument, legislative drafting, appearances before congressional committees, public debates and speeches, and even into political campaigning.

These were the accomplishments for which we honored and stood in awe of him but they were not the reasons we cherished him. Upon the occasion of Felix Frankfurter's death Alex told his students that there are men who are far more in person than the written legacy they leave. That is certainly true of Alex. He was and, through our memories, he remains much more than his written product, marvellous as it is. The resources of language are not adequate, in my hands at least, to convey the full man. The particular cannot be recaptured—his style, vitality, gaiety, courage, his argumentative drive, the astonishing flow of words, ideas, insights, wit, his rapid sympathy and genuine affections. Sure of himself, he showed his thoughts and feelings freely. He created for us a sense of community, and even in death he does that again, creating a community of those who knew and loved him, who may not know each other but do know a bond of common sorrow and shared memory.

Alex achieved greatness in the law and he achieved it early. It is startling to realize that this man who died at forty-nine, with his powers still developing, had published five books, all of them important, and at least two of them—*The Least Dangerous Branch* and *The Warren Court and the Idea of Progress*—major intellectual events in the law. Furthermore, there are two more books coming. One is a volume of the

Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court. The other is a collection of some of his shorter pieces, including some that are as beautifully written, perceptive, and provocative as anything he ever did.

His intellectual legacy consists also of the things he did not write but said to hundreds and hundreds of students and scores of friends and colleagues. He was a teacher and the impact of his spoken thoughts is impossible to measure. But there will always be a difference in the things we choose to do and the way we do them because we knew Alex Bickel.

An obituary spoke of the tension between Alex's judicial conservatism and political liberalism. That tension he resolved in the last several years, though whether the resulting symmetry was liberal or conservative need not trouble us here. He was, as his writings amply attest, quite pessimistic about the judiciary's capacity to manage large social reforms, as well as, to put the point mildly, highly dubious about the legitimacy of much asserted judicial authority.

In an article for *Commentary* this year, he argued that: "The assault upon the legal order by moral imperatives wasn't only or perhaps even the most effectively an assault from the outside. It came as well from within, in the Supreme Court headed for fifteen years by Earl Warren.... More than once, and in some of its most important actions, the Warren Court got over doctrinal difficulties or issues of the allocation of competences among various institutions by asking what it viewed as a decisive practical question: If the Court did not take a certain action which was *right* and *good*, would other institutions do so, given political realities?"

That, Alex thought, was deeply, profoundly wrong. Expressing a thought central to his philosophy, he said: "It is the premise of our legal order that its own complicated arrangements, although subject to evolutionary change, are more important than any momentary objective."

Where others saw legal technicalities to be cut through, Alex saw process, order, stability, safety from arbitrary power, a mechanism for change that is gradual and accepted as legitimate by the society. He understood that our form of law is a social creation of enormous value but also complex, delicate, and distinctly vulnerable.

To read his *New Republic* piece on Edmund Burke is to see that his political philosophy had come into alignment with his legal philosophy. "Our problem," Alex wrote, "has been, and is most acutely now, the tyrannical tendency of ideas and the suicidal emptiness of a politics without ideas...." Alex approved both Burke's principles and "Burke's

steady sense of their limits," his ability to apply to every question both principle and expediency or prudence, his pragmatism, and his stress upon the importance of place and circumstance.

Alex argued that our problem, like Burke's, is that we cannot govern with abstract theories of rights and values and yet cannot live, let alone govern, without a coherent scheme of values. He concluded that "Burke's conservatism, if that is what it was, which at any rate belongs to the liberal tradition, properly understood and translated to our time, is the way."

It is no mystery that Alex found Burke so congenial, for Alex, too, though deeply and consistently moral, hated the assertion of ultimate and transcendent principles and the apocalyptic rhetoric that so often accompanies them. He thought such principles always pernicious, and their joinder to popular movements frightening. In politics, as in law, he believed in the importance of context, of the particular, in weighing, balancing, judging differences in degree, and most certainly in the importance of organic growth and tradition.

We often taught seminars together. In our last one I was groping for hard, sharp doctrine to control judicial review. Alex insisted that the doctrine could not be constructed and that we must rely instead upon tradition and wisdom. I am afraid I never gave him reason to doubt the soundness of his insight. Finally, in considerable frustration, I told the class, "Mr. Bickel's legal philosophy is a cross between Edmund Burke and Fiddler on the Roof." That was a remark he liked and repeated, perhaps because it fit much more about him than just his legal philosophy.

At the time of his death Alex was moving on to a new range of work in political theory. The Burke article was a first probe. He started from a combined base in law and history that is unmatched. And he possessed the genius to bring his vast erudition into focus, being able to move easily between the most technical legal doctrine and the broadest political speculation, to relate, say, the decline of the Article III case-or-controversy requirement to the discouraging impact of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment upon contemporary American political trends. The years of his accomplishment that we look upon with amazement were in fact only the prelude to work of a range and profundity that we can only begin to imagine, and whose loss is a national loss.

I almost hesitate to speak of Alex as a friend, for that was a relationship so precious that talking may put at risk the full

(continued on page 29)



Marc. F. Plattner

A Campaign Reform for Yesteryear

Richard Nixon's announcement of his impending resignation was not the only event that made August 8, 1974, a crucial date in the history of the American Presidency. On that same day, the House of Representatives, after long uncertainty and delay, approved legislation providing for the public financing of all future Presidential elections. (The Senate had already passed similar legislation in April.) The combination of the House vote and the Nixon resignation made it all but certain that public financing would become law. Nixon had made perfectly clear his own strong opposition to such a measure, and until his departure, the threat of a Presidential veto could not be discounted. His successor was also reportedly opposed to public financing but the prospect of a Ford veto never seemed very credible; especially after the Nixon pardon, the political costs of such a move would have been too great. On October 15 President Ford signed the bill.

The new campaign financing law will change the face of American politics. The apparent intent of the legislation is to reduce the amounts spent in Presidential elections and to minimize the influence of large contributors on the campaign process. These goals will probably be attained, but it is likely that the new set of regulations will also produce a number of other important consequences largely unforeseen—or, at any rate, unheeded—by its supporters.

Perhaps the most important of these unintended results will be a further weakening of our already ailing political parties. To see why this is likely to be so, it is only necessary to think a bit about some of the key provisions of the new law. First, it puts a \$20 million limit (in 1972, Nixon spent \$56 million and McGovern about \$35 million) on each Presidential candidate's general election expenditures, and awards a sum of this amount from the public treasury to each major-party nominee. This is simple enough, but matters could not be left at

that; for the Democratic and Republican Parties do not enjoy an Constitutional status; and the law cannot blatantly discriminate against other parties. So the following scheme was devised: If a party's Presidential candidate received *more* than 25 percent of the popular vote in the *preceding* elections, it qualifies as a major party and its nominee receives full public funding. But if the party's candidate in the preceding election received between 5 and 25 percent, it is defined as a minor party. In this case, its nominee is awarded public funds in an amount "which bears the same ratio to the amount...for a major party [i.e., \$20 million] as the number of popular votes received by the candidate for President of the minor party...in the preceding Presidential election bears to the average number of popular votes received by the candidates for President of the major parties in the preceding Presidential election." Thus if the law had been operative in 1972, John Schmitz, as the candidate of the American Independent Party, would have received about \$6 million in public funds (since George Wallace's 1968 vote total of just under 10 million was almost one third of the average total of about 31.5 million amassed by the two major-party candidates).

It is true that this aspect of the new law does not help—and may even hurt—*new* third-party movements, which will still have to raise all their campaign funds from private sources. (They may, however, benefit from another provision of the new law which grants a post-election reimbursement to new parties if they gain more than 5 percent of the vote.) But the prospect of *future* public funding—once they have made a single creditable showing—is likely to supply a strong incentive for new third-party efforts.

What effects is this incentive likely to produce in 1976 and 1980? Well, Eugene McCarthy has been talking of starting up a new third-party movement on the Left,

and, especially if the Democrats nominate a centrist in 1976, it is possible that such a party could obtain 5 percent of the vote. Without the new campaign law, a 5 percent showing would not be terribly encouraging, and the new party might well fade away before 1980. But with the new law, such a showing in 1976 would guarantee the leftist party's 1980 nominee over \$2 million in public funds, and thus almost certainly assure its continued existence.

Then, of course, there is a real possibility of a third-party candidacy on the Right in 1976—from George Wallace, Ronald Reagan, or perhaps even a joint Reagan-Wallace ticket. And since a third-party Reagan or Wallace candidacy could easily win 10 or 15 percent of the vote, it could, under the new law, establish a strong financial base for a right-wing party in 1980 and beyond. Indeed, it is not wholly inconceivable that a Reagan-Wallace ticket might, given a certain combination of political and economic circumstances, finish second in 1976. Let us assume the following hypothetical vote totals for 1976: Democrats, 50 percent; Reagan-Wallace, 26 percent; Republicans, 24 percent. This outcome would yield the following amounts of public funds for 1980: Democrats, \$20 million; rightists (having now qualified as a "major party"), \$20 million; Republicans (having fallen below 25 percent and now treated according to the formula for a "minor party"), \$13 million. This, of course, would severely cripple the Republican Party—but it would not be a deathblow. For the assurance of even \$13 million in public funds for 1980 would constitute a powerful incentive against the wholesale abandonment or dissolution of the party. In this kind of situation, the new law would encourage not realignment into a new two-party configuration, but the perpetuation of a three-party configuration.

It is hard to say how much the prospect of laying the foundations of a right-wing

party might tempt Reagan or Wallace. The 1976 election probably represents the last shot at the Presidency for both of them, so they *personally* would not be able to cash in on the benefits the new law might provide a rightist party candidate in 1980. Yet many of their aides and potential supporters presumably *would* be strengthened in their third-party inclinations, and this might help persuade Reagan and/or Wallace to go the third-party route in 1976.

Those parts of the new law dealing with Presidential primaries may tend to weaken our two major parties in another way—by encouraging their internal polarization along ideological lines. The need for private fund-raising at the *pre-nomination* stage will remain as crucial as ever, but it will be carried on under vastly altered conditions. The 1974 law limits individual donations to \$1,000 and organizational contributions to \$5,000, but provides public funds to match private contributions of up to \$250. In order to

qualify for these matching funds, a candidate must first raise \$5,000 in contributions of \$250 or less in each of twenty states. Total spending of primary candidates is limited to \$10 million, and there are also ceilings on spending in any particular state.

The effect of the new law will be to concentrate all fund-raising efforts on the search for contributions to primary campaigns. There can no longer be "regular contributors" to Democratic or Republican Presidential candidates. Those who wish to make donations directly to major-party Presidential aspirants will have to confine their giving to the prenomination stage. This will inevitably tend to heighten the attachment of many politically involved citizens to particular intraparty factions—at the expense of their attachment to the party as a whole.

Moreover, by eliminating the role of large contributors and by matching contributions of up to \$250 with public funds,

the new law puts a premium on the medium-sized contributor. The most important source of funds will be the uppermiddle class, and the key means of tapping this source will be the direct-mail campaign. In other words, fund-raising efforts will concentrate on the class most receptive to ideological appeals, and will rely upon a method that is most easily organized upon an ideological basis. Once again, the effect will be to increase polarization within the parties.

It is always risky to speculate about the various consequences of any new piece of legislation, and the 1974 campaign law offers no exception to this rule. But its impact is likely to be so far-reaching that one only wishes that the proponents of this law had speculated somewhat more thoughtfully and energetically than they did. It seems obvious, even now, that this is essentially a backward-looking piece of legislation, i.e., an effort to correct some of the abuses of the 1972 campaign. But time, alas, runs forward, not backward. □

Neil Howe

The Outlook in Vietnam

Neil Howe, formerly managing editor of *The Alternative*, recently returned from an investigative tour of South Vietnam. This is the second part of his two-part report.

4. The Economy

American withdrawal and continuing war has meant for South Vietnam that its people must bear all the suffering, and enjoy none of the benefits, of rapid industrialization. Over the last fifteen years peasants have been steadily driven from the countryside by fighting and enticed into the cities by loose American dollars. Now that the dollars have vanished, South Vietnam finds that its agricultural output is inadequate, its cities are overcrowded with the unemployed, and its social structure rendered dangerously fluid by disoriented, second-generation town dwellers. What is worse, the urban unemployed are also unemployable—since, without industry, there was no genuine economic reason for them to be urban in the first place. As an inevitable result, South Vietnam over the last four years has slipped into a serious depression, marked by increasing unemployment and inflation, decreasing wage rates, and a worsening balance of trade.

Over the short run, the government is using every artificial stimulant at its disposal to keep the economy on its feet. "We are following President Roosevelt's directions," I was told by Nguyen Dang Khoi, Assistant Minister of Trade and Industry, shrewdly picking an example I would appreciate. So far this consists of

preferential loan rates to business (14 instead of 28 percent), widely distributed government contracts to private companies, and judiciously liquid use of American economic aid. The compromise, as always, is between skyrocketing inflation if the budget is too much on the deficit side and even worse unemployment if the government does not spend freely enough. A 60 percent inflation figure for the first months of 1974 would indicate that the Ministry of the Economy prefers the former path; unemployment, it is felt, leads to political trouble faster than inflation.

If the government is concerned with political trouble born of economic discontent, it doesn't worry about the countryside. The depression is quite a bit milder there, and the Vietnamese peasant, whose wants are seldom greater than his meager needs, finds his standard of living basically unchanged. No, it was only in the large cities where I saw the disgruntled mien of people once used to an easier, better life, people who no doubt have come to take the Western rule of rising expectations for granted. Downtown Saigon is strewn with the markings of unexpected austerity: large, abandoned buildings; stores with few customers; street lights and sidewalks in disrepair, and rows of rickety stalls set up by jobless families eager to sell just one of a few paltry items. Government efforts to reduce unnecessary consumption, though certainly justified, rile the marketers who depend upon volume turnover of goods for their existence. Not long ago, the government tried to lessen a serious

balance of payments deficit by a prohibitive 400 percent increase in gasoline prices. Needless to say, the pinch was felt in the cities. The peasant, though he knows of gasoline, probably doesn't use it, and just to explain to him the meaning of "luxury consumption" would be an awesome task.

To reverse the South's disastrous pseudoindustrialization, the government is trying to rebuild Vietnam's agricultural base, thereby creating jobs directly or indirectly in rural areas. The Republic's first goal, I am told, is to be independent in basic foodstuffs, especially rice, by 1975 or 1976. The record over the last few years is encouraging: it shows a continuing decrease in rice imports, from 850,000 tons in 1970 to only 250,000 tons in 1974, about 5 percent of its needs (North Vietnam still imports one third of its rice). The government has been helped by a welcome reduction of enemy activity in the bounteous Delta area. Less rice is being destroyed in scorched-earth campaigns and less is being sold on black markets to agents for Communist soldiers. Moreover, the yield of rice per hectare of land is rising dramatically, thanks to years of work by U.S. and Taiwanese scientists on "miracle" grains. Most Vietnamese peasants now have the chance, if they can afford the initial cost of fertilizer, to plant seeds that will yield two, three, even four crops per year instead of the traditional one crop.

If self-sufficiency is achieved, it will be due in part to resettlement, which is still the government's most energetically pursued social-economic program. Not

only have resettled villages improved the South's agricultural production by increasing the total area of cultivation; they have also offered a new livelihood to the jobless and thus relieved what was once the worst source of urban overcrowding, deprivation, and unrest. The numbers are impressive. Near the end of 1972 it was estimated that well over one million refugees—most of these from the Easter Communist Offensive—were living hand-to-mouth in the large cities, most notably Saigon and Da Nang, and along the central coast. About two-thirds of these stayed in government camps, where they received little more than one pound of rice per person per day and endured atrocious living conditions. In July 1974, Deputy Prime Minister Phan Quang Dan, who has administered the LDHB (Land Development and Hamlet Building) program since 1972, announced that as a result of resettlement the last main government camps had been emptied and closed down. The few that remain open today, he observes, offer temporary shelter only to recent refugees of current fighting.

But the program will not end here. According to Dan, the government still has nearly 3,000,000 applicants for resettlement from out-of-camp families, most of whom were probably never refugees to begin with. Once an estimated half of these applications are accepted, the standard and now proven method for founding new villages will again be followed on a nationwide scale: representatives from the applicants will be asked to help the government choose the land; all the resettlers will then settle on the new site in temporary tent-shelters and help clear the area for cultivation; and finally permanent houses will be built while cultivation begins. This new stage of resettlement is particularly encouraging since it indicates that some of the South's semipermanent urban population is at last returning to the country. "This is not forced relocation," Dan carefully explained to me, making sure that I did not confuse his present efforts with the "strategic hamlet" scheme implemented on and off during the sixties. But there is no question that the LDHB program is working in the government's favor by offering sites where the villages can be more easily protected by ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam). Large numbers of refugees from the northernmost provinces, for instance, are resettling in areas, both fertile and secure, south and northeast of Saigon. The layout of the villages themselves must of military necessity follow a compact design, with houses and gardens close together and the fields surrounding.

In the Southeast Asian climate, agricultural development brings rapid and even spectacular returns, but even the traditional Vietnamese know that agriculture does not make a complete economy. Next to rice, South Vietnam's two largest industries are timber and fish, neither of which shows encouraging prospects right now. Large-scale devel-

opment of a timber industry will never be possible so long as the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) control or contest the forests. As for fish, although the world market price is rising, the actual export sales of the South Vietnamese are falling due to decreased allotments of fuel available to trawlers. More fish can be exported if oil prices are lowered, but this last condition seems unlikely anywhere in the near future.

The Ministry of Trade and Industry, a youthful and enthusiastic group under the directorship of Nguyen Duc Cuong (under thirty years old and a graduate of MIT), is nevertheless undaunted. If Vietnam cannot profit more from its current commodities, well, then it's time to get some help in finding new ones. It is a credit to the Ministry's sense of vision that it is at least eager for foreign investments, even if so far investors haven't been exactly pounding at the door. What might foreign corporations be interested in? First of all, observes Cuong, there are mineral deposits scattered over the Central Highlands, and the world price of minerals is rising, though he admits that not much can be done to exploit them while fighting in the interior still rages. Then too, there are Vietnam's beautiful, endless, bleach-white beaches—which, economically, reduce to two profitable options: (1) exportation of a very pure grade of silica for glass production, and (2) tourism. The former might take place on a large scale within five years. The latter would be a godsend to an economy already geared to services, but again the problem remains the war, and the improbability of generating sufficient publicity and good will to make upper-middle-class Westerners forsake Bali Hai for the turquoise waters of Nha Trang.

Oil is yet another splendid dream for the future of the South, although it probably will not be, as a few government officials have rashly predicted, the economic salvation of the nation. There is always an outside possibility, of course, that oil could someday be South Vietnam's major export. But only someday. Just two test-drillings have been made so far by a U.S. Shell-City Services consortium; these, along with seismic surveys, indicate that some oil lies in pockets under shallow water about 100 miles off the Delta shoreline. When and if it is found in quantities that would justify production, the government will receive a cut of the profits and workers a new job market. But the Shell technicians still have no reason to believe that these pockets will be any more profitable than the marginal yield of, say, Burma or Malaysia. More importantly, it will be at least ten years before any company can be producing in significant quantities. The best result of the oil-boom rumors until now has been the government sale of exploration rights to industry. A quarter of the likely seabed has been "sold" already for \$30 million outright, and the price is rising. Possibly, if oil prospects grow more certain, the government will be able to borrow money

against future production, and thereby turn a long-range hope into short-range assets.

In any case, the Ministry of Trade and Industry is certain that South Vietnam possesses one commodity which investors must find irresistible: workers. Unskilled labor here is dismally cheap (from \$.80/day, compared to \$2.00/day in Taiwan or \$3.00/day in Hong Kong) and rising wages in the industrial nations make it seem cheaper still. Presently, the government is setting up "free zones" near the coast where foreign industry can set up shop tariff-free in return for using an agreed-upon percentage of Vietnamese labor and management. A handful of corporations (primarily for electronics and appliance assembly) have accepted this offer, but if foreign businesses have not yet responded in droves, it is because they still worry about the security of their investment. After all, if any airfield in Vietnam can be hit by a night-time rocket volley, there is not much chance that the government can guarantee protection to shiny new refineries. Most potential investors, moreover, still express misgivings about the long-range stability of the Republic's economic policies. Certainly many agents of foreign business are sending mixed reports back home, complaining about needless and arbitrary harassment from government bureaucracies.

The Vietnamese are not, I must add here, a naturally commercial or economic-minded people. There are historical reasons for this. The classic Confucian model of society puts the trader on the bottom rung—below administrators, warriors, and even peasants. And the French did not remedy this bias very effectively. Not only does French culture itself suspect industry, but the French colonialists, though they did offer upward-bound Vietnamese a hand in governing, kept commercial management exclusively to themselves. The consequences today are singular. Upper-class, governing South Vietnamese, probably better versed in Western culture than Americans through their impeccable knowledge of French language and history, are strangely inept in economic affairs. It is true that a younger generation of Vietnamese, speaking better English than French, are just now beginning to change this trend. It is no accident, for example, that the members of the Ministry of Trade and Industry average about twenty-five years of age or that most of them are alumni of American universities. Most South Vietnamese, however, continue to look upon "trade and industry" as something mysterious, alien, and quite possibly subversive to the Vietnam in which they have grown up.

The Chinese in South Vietnam, most of whom live in the huge, urban "Cholon" district (pop. 1,000,000) just west of Saigon, are a living reminder of how much a nation's economy is shaped not by its resources, but by the character of its people. To walk from Saigon into

Cholon is to leave quiet, shaded streets, hollow-looking buildings, and slow-pedaling bicycles, and enter suddenly into a bustling, miniature Hong Kong. The Cholon Chinese, perhaps because they want to afford the accessories that go nicely with Western clothes, keep up lively trade despite the depression which surrounds them. They possess several distinctly un-Vietnamese traits—flexibility, innovation, and a desire to imitate—all of which make them good businessmen. American firms would, no doubt, much rather deal with the Cholonites and let mingle the somewhat amoral longing for a dollar, than to chafe under the more rigid sobriety of the Vietnamese character. The South Vietnamese people of course desire wealth, but they aren't willing to change much in the pursuit of wealth. The Republican government knows this, and therefore some of its seemingly backward policies are really a result of rapid economic progress being traded for political stability.

5. The Thieu Regime

The present administration of Nguyen Van Thieu is, despite recent demonstrations and Thieu's promise not to run for a third term, one of the most encouraging signs for the future of this unfortunate nation. Thieu has brought nearly eight years of stability to the national government, and stability is, for the typical Vietnamese, an essential characteristic of good government. If he is not charismatic, he is—unlike the dapper Ky—hard-working. ("The Vietnamese at last found out," President of the Senate Tram Van Lan sagely remarked to me one evening, "that Ky was really just a bad boy.") If Thieu is not a people's hero, neither is he, like Diem and Nhu in their last years, the epitome of the aloof, Western-styled autocrat. Thieu can rally his people in a time of crisis, he is a demonstrative orator on television and radio, and he can make the politic gestures of solidarity. He is, moreover, a martial symbol. Loyal Democrats still recall the time during the 1972 Offensive when Thieu flew in by helicopter to the beleaguered town of An Loc and exhorted his troops amid falling rockets.

What is rarely credited to Thieu is that during the years of his presidency—and unremitting war—he has cultivated and cautiously overseen the growth of legitimate, opposition party politics in the South. This is not to say that Thieu was unopposed by American voters and the Vietnamese intelligentsia; but the achievement ought to be put in historical perspective. The institution of political parties in a democratic framework is a first for Vietnam. Americans attend carefully, as they should, to the doleful rhetoric of the opposition parties, but often without recollecting that less than a generation ago legal opposition in the South was (and still is in the North) out of the question.

Of course, this development hasn't been smooth going, nor has Thieu's

Democratic Party restrained itself from some awfully malodorous political tactics. Perhaps the worst scar on the Democratic record dates back to the first presidential election in 1967, when Thieu, right after defeating the Saigon lawyer Truong Dinh Du by a two-to-one vote, threw Du into prison for five years on questionable charges of sedition. The Opposition also remembers well the 1967 trial of Deputy Tran Ngoc Csau, Secretary of the Lower House, which was, they say, a coverup for Communists discovered working high in Thieu's administration, or the imprisonment of several Saigon Demonstration leaders, such as Mrs. Ngo Ba Tsans. It seems to be an open secret that in the late sixties Democrats occasionally used bribery to get important resolutions through the Assembly and possessed "signed resignations" of their own members so that they would always vote the party line. Even the Opposition admits that these practices have since been discontinued, but now it is accusing the Democrats of tyranny in a new guise:

Critics forget that Thieu has cultivated and overseen the growth of legitimate political opposition, a first for Vietnam.

the "Election Decree" passed in December 1972, which requires every party to have a minimum vote of 5 percent in every province. "Obviously," I was told by one radical opposition leader, "by abrogating the original Political Party Law of 1969, Thieu has not stopped trying to suppress us."

So the national government is certainly not perfect democracy, nor does it yet facilitate a smooth interaction of interest groups. It still operates in jumps and starts. But the encouraging sign is that sound precedents are being set, defining the boundary of power between the executive and the legislature, and that the general trend is toward more freely elected and more freely acting representatives. The present legislature, such as it is, was founded in 1967 and is called the National "Constituent" Assembly; it is made up of two houses, the "Senate" (60 seats) whose members are elected by province for six-year terms, and the "Lower House" (159 seats) whose members are elected by district for two-year terms. Both houses meet together for several months each year in what used to be a grand French opera house in downtown Saigon. There, after discussion, debate, and even (I am told) thrown ashtrays, resolutions are either approved or defeated. The elected President

commands the armed forces through the chiefs of staff, but if the legislature is dissatisfied with the executive all it can do, theoretically, is throw out the Prime Minister, who is chosen by the President and who is supposed to carry out all non-military policy. So far, the Assembly has not forced Thieu to back down on any crucial issue. But Opposition leaders can find there a public forum, resolutions reproving Thieu are sometimes passed, and Thieu himself knows that the Assembly cannot be ignored for long without bringing most governmental business to a complete halt.

Civil liberties in South Vietnam are reasonably well protected by a respected and closely-knit community of lawyers. Members of the Assembly, most of whom have a legal background, recently demonstrated their peculiarly French-American concern for an absolute arbiter of due process by insisting upon the election of a Supreme Court. The much-criticized power of "administrative detention" does enable the executive to imprison anyone for a period of up to two years, but it is rarely used nowadays and significantly all national and local elected officials are granted a sort of tribunal immunity. They cannot be arrested without the prior vote of the Assembly. As far as I could determine, freedom of press and of speech has flourished, although the recent shutdown of five Saigon newspapers is an ominous sign. Among the people I talked to who wished to denounce Thieu, the Democrats, or the army, did I sense any hesitancy to do so in the sharpest imaginable language? Indeed, freedom of speech in South Vietnam probably exceeds that of most nations in the western hemisphere, none of which is presently at war.

This is a good thing, since quite a few Vietnamese daily exercise this freedom to the limit. They are known as the "Opposition," and if President Thieu personifies all that the government performs and symbolizes, then the word "Opposition," frequently heard, embraces all the diverse political forces critical of government policy. Even in the Assembly, the Opposition can range from obligingly moderate to scathingly radical. And most of the Opposition's strength appears in disputes outside the formal political framework, especially since political issues to the Vietnamese mingle inseparably with broader cultural and religious values. Several of the small parties in the Assembly, for example, the Cao Dai or the Hoa Hao, represent coherent religious groups which over the years have accepted an uneasy alliance with the Thieu regime and which now simply want to protect their own interests. The Catholics are making a few tentative efforts to form their own "Liberal Party," but acting *en masse* their formidable political influence is felt not in the Assembly, but in the streets and in government offices. The Buddhists are apolitical as a matter of principle; Buddhist leaders, however activist, refuse to attach themselves to political parties for fear (a not unreason-

able fear) of being rendered impure and unholy. And as long as I am scanning the spectrum of Opposition forces, from legitimate to illegitimate, I ought to mention finally the political arms of the Communists—their party, the NLF, in the cities, and their government, the PRG, in the country. These, of course, remain utterly outside the authority of the Republican government and, officially, still insist upon the *political* conquest of Vietnam. One day, they say, all Vietnamese will voluntarily switch their allegiance to the PRG, and until then the PRG must “defend” itself. It is known that the Communists have their own secret “provisional” functionaries in every city and village in South Vietnam. It is a hidden web, it is the “other government.” It plays no part in Saigon politics, not because there is a law prohibiting avowedly Communist political parties (although there is such a law), but because it is opposed to the whole “sham” of liberal, democratic government.

The reasons that people become adherents of the Opposition are about as wide and varied as the word “Opposition” suggests. They are “against” what is—and in a period of war and severe economic distress it can be expected that many people are against what is—for no particular reason. This is especially true of the demonstrative and unpredictable Buddhist Opposition, whose history of antagonism to Saigon regimes has been a long, bloody, and surprisingly successful series of revolts. Diem came crashing down in 1963 largely through the efforts of his Buddhist opponents; General Khanh could not handle them in 1964, nor Ky in 1965; they were the catalyst that finally pushed Thieu to grant elections in 1967 and a National Assembly in 1968. Effective as they are, their political program is thinner than air. They mix Buddhist ideals with a sort of dreamy demagoguery and cram their pamphlets with meaningless injunctions to the government, such as “All those who see themselves as an obstacle to peace must resign!” Followers generally come from the poorest of politically active Vietnamese; leaders are several thousand Buddhist monks and nuns, members of the United Buddhist Congregation, attached to pagodas and universities throughout South Vietnam. In recent years, the Buddhist Opposition has been strangely quiet—“waiting,” according to the Venerable Thich Quang Do, “Speaker” of the renowned An Quang Pagoda in Saigon, “until we see a future leader of Vietnam, then we will demonstrate in the streets.” Less sympathetic observers suggest that Buddhist strength has declined due to the increasing political sophistication of the average citizen.

The Catholic Opposition has recently and dramatically risen to prominence through the tireless energy of an aging, soft-spoken priest, Father Tran Huu Thanh of South Vietnam's Redemptorist Church. Since Vietnamese Catholics, as a

whole well-educated, comprise a disproportionate percentage of South Vietnam's professional and managerial talent, it is not surprising that Opposition Catholics are more Western in their politics and rational in their demands than the Buddhists. Their complaints are based entirely on the issue of corruption, in particular on a famous list of “Six Points,” compiled by Thanh, which spell out specific charges of malfeasance against President Thieu and his executive subalterns. Thanh's efforts are stirring up the ordinarily loyal and unpolitical Catholics, and though the turnout for his demonstrations in the smaller towns is still unimpressive, in Saigon tens of thousands of Catholics fill the streets at his bidding. Several bishops have publicly announced their support for Thanh including, recently, the archbishop of Saigon. President Thieu, himself a Catholic convert, doubtless looks upon this movement as the single greatest threat to his power. In the understatement of his broken French, Thanh

If the Republic can last through its 1976 elections and the coming offensive, its long-term survival will be fairly well assured.

assures those who talk with him that “I have nothing against Thieu personally, or the government,” and his organization insists that it is vehemently anti-Communist. They just want an end to corruption. Taking Thanh at his word, Thieu has released since October 1974 repeated assurances that “I punish severely corruption” and has undertaken the much-publicized dismissal of generals, province chiefs, and cabinet ministers. Whether his words, or deeds, will satisfy the aroused Catholics remains to be seen.

So there is significant political opposition to Thieu and the Democrats, but its strength ought not to be exaggerated. In the Assembly, the Opposition controls, at most, one third of the seats. Among the Buddhists, spiritual enthusiasm seems incapable of reenacting the fervid sixties. And as for the Catholic demonstrations, these have been small outside of Saigon, that is, outside the influence of the “Westernized” Opposition. Even if they do force Thieu to step down, it will be clear that their purpose has been to “demonstrate” their disapproval of Thieu's misdeeds—not their disapproval of the government as such. Thus they mark an advance in the ability of South Vietnamese to draw distinctions between leaders and institutions. What hampers the Opposition most is the brute fact of

war. Opposition moderates detest slovenly administration and venal officials, but they fear the NVA troops even more. They are keenly aware that any lengthy interregnum of government power would play lethally into Communist hands. No doubt most Buddhist leaders don't give these worldly contingencies a second thought, but to Huy, for instance, leader of the Opposition in the Senate, it is a constant dilemma. If Thieu falls before the 1976 election, it will be either because he resigns, or because the Opposition is convinced that it has sufficient leadership and popular support to move him swiftly out of office in a coup d'etat. As yet, the latter conditions do not exist.

6. The Future

How long will the South survive? During the American era, the short-term future of the Republic was guaranteed; the problem was how to create permanent legitimacy. Today, the situation is reversed. The institutions of government enjoy increasing popular respect and show every sign of long-term success. The problem is how to prevent a series of immediate crises from forcing the Republic's collapse. In politics, South Vietnamese wonder whether the most conspicuous forms of corruption (graft in military personnel payments, market manipulation by large importers, and illegal payments to ministry officials and province chiefs) can be halted within the emerging parliamentary system, or whether one or more coups will install a string of “strongmen” and erase the stability wrought by Thieu. While the economy is setting itself once more upon the firm foundation of agriculture and on the gradual but certain development of industry, there is a danger that worsening depression will break the people's patience. Finally, there are the plans of the Communist military command, who will no doubt wait until the health of the Republic has reached some sort of nadir before launching their formidable offensive. By my own rough estimate, if the Republic can last three or four more years, past the 1976 national election and the coming offensive (which may already be underway), its long-term survival will be fairly well assured. Eventually the NVA will be unable to afford its current strength in the South, and (as has already happened in the lower Delta) the VC and PRG will reach, province by province, a *modus vivendi* with the decentralized government administration.

With regard to the arguments which used to consume so much intellectual energy among Americans, I left South Vietnam with two indelible and rather sobering impressions. First, it seems almost embarrassingly clear that the Republic's present success has been achieved in many respects because of, rather than in spite of, the American withdrawal. Perhaps the Republic would have fallen without massive U.S. troop support, but in any case it is unpardonable that our own leadership forgot that

warfare is more than mere technology, that it failed to examine the political impact of both our physical presence and our symbolic usurpation of the South's governing institutions. Today a truly Vietnamese government is succeeding largely because its policies, designed not for "victory" but for the peculiar political and economic interests of its people, can at last compete in popularity with the reactionary traditionalism of the Communists.

Second, nothing is so uselessly academic as to study the flaws of the Republican government without considering Vietnam's extraordinary history or possible political alternatives. However much the semifeudal instincts of the South Vietnamese may resent the rule of any

national government, most can guess the consequences, should their own Republic fall, of North Vietnam's sought-after "reunification." They know that in the North free speech and press are out of the question, political opposition is not only illegal but purges have been carried out against opponents involving hundreds of thousands of victims, the practice of any religion is being successfully eliminated by prohibiting the education of clergy or monks, intellectual freedom is so utterly extinguished that the Vietnamese language itself is kept "pure" from new words, courts of law are directed by Party officials according to no written code and "law" is not even taught at the University of Hanoi, and the Party leadership will

fully feeds the nation's GNP to war while the peasants suffer dreadful poverty. They know especially that the only test run for Hanoi's NLF in a Southern city occurred in February 1968, in Hue, where Communist leaders during their two-week occupation did nothing significant except execute the city's thousand leading citizens. You do not have to be all that Western in outlook to oppose such monstrous behavior. In the midst of war, you must act and make not the good choice but the best choice. Most South Vietnamese have chosen the Thieu regime—however corrupt its generals or rigged its elections—which will defend them, ease them gently into the twentieth century, and otherwise leave them alone. □

Paul Gottfried

A Modern Gulliver

Duncan Williams, who is currently my colleague at Rockford College, is a man of varied talents. A former officer in the Royal Marines, a popular lecturer on English literature and a widely published educational theorist, he has also gained distinction since 1971 as the author of the English bestseller, *Trousered Apes*. His work, a study in cultural criticism, has been described as both learned and bitter, while its writer has often been presented as a reactionary pessimist looking toward the onset of his self-proclaimed apocalypse. There is of course much in his observations that is reminiscent of earlier thinkers (Burckhardt, Spengler, Henry Adams, et al.), who had similar misgivings about the breakdown of moral and artistic standards in their own generation. Nonetheless, like Mr. Williams, I believe that the fears of such pessimists were at least partly justified. Indeed since the emergence of the counterculture, it seems almost impossible to ignore his warnings about the growing "bestialization" of modern man.

Since his book deals with cultural decadence, it rightly begins by defining those ideals from which the present age has fallen. These ideals are identified with the Western classical heritage, and while this heritage can be traced back to ancient social teachings and Aristotelian esthetics, its values, according to Williams, were particularly well expressed in eighteenth century British literature. What was common to the satires of Dryden and Jane Austen and to the artistic maxims of Pope, Johnson, and Burke was the belief in a distinction between pure effusiveness and the demands of proper literary expression. Without overlooking the brutal side of human nature, these writers offered a measured portrayal of life as containing both virtue and vice, and recognized

literature as serving a moral and educational intent. No less a misanthrope than Swift, according to Williams, stressed the didactic purpose of his satire, and even spoke of his affection for men as individuals if not collectively.

Williams then turns to those characteristics of modern literature which are repeatedly found in some of its most respected representatives. Violent and often perverse sexuality, savage hatred, and utter despair over the possibility of discovering meaning in life are all recurrent themes in such widely admired writers as Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Genet, John Osborne, Edward Albee, and Norman Mailer. Throwing to the wind all thematic restraints, modern authors have also become fixated on frank expression, even to the point of reveling in brutal and scatological speech. Because of their attraction to coarseness and animality, Williams characterizes the devotees of the new literary culture as "trousered apes," after the reference of C. S. Lewis to the morally insensitive products of an antitraditionalist education. To illustrate the distance between classical and current literary values, Williams offers two lengthy citations: the first, the opening tiff between Mr. and Mrs. Bennett in Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*; and the other, a denunciation of his upper-class wife given by John Osborne's proletarian protagonist in the play *Look Back in Anger*. Both scenes concern themselves with marital friction, but the characters and their relations bear no resemblance to each other. While Mr. Bennett gently rebukes his wife for being vain, Osborne's hero (or antihero) goes off to complain to a friend, before whom he truculently ridicules his spouse's sexual behavior. Unlike the eighteenth-century writer, the modern one feels no obligation to present marriage as an

institution that should and often does rest on civility. He would rather see it as one more thematic opportunity for showing, and frequently exalting, the ferocity of human nature.

Inasmuch as Williams believes that "literature and the arts are real, formative social forces moulding the face of an age," the tendencies described give him cause for concern. And he attempts to fight them by calling attention to their underlying fallacies. Thus he argues as a defender of neoclassicism: "There is nothing fundamentally more realistic or more 'natural' about a public urinal or a kitchen sink or a paranoid-schizophrenic than there is about a tranquil lawn or a cultivated household or a balanced mind." He also dwells, in *Trousered Apes* and in his essays, on the steady erosion of the belief in moral custom in modern culture. Instead of assuming the need for moral standards—and at least the partial validity of existing ones—within each society, the Western intelligentsia for some time now has been engaged in attacking ethical conventions. In the process, they have turned their mockery against all traditional impulses (which are described as "programming") except for those forms of self-assertion that enable men "to become authentic." Unfortunately, however, authenticity is too often equated by existentialists and psychologists with a victory over social constraint. In modern literature, the same quest for authenticity has resulted in the continuing predilection for the boorish antihero and for the violent pervers.

Williams is perhaps at his best in pointing out the thrust of this nihilism. Drawing upon the creations of Swift, he makes reference to Gulliver's experiences among two tribes, the Houyhnhnms and the Yahoos. While the first

beyond any resemblance to men, Gulliver found the second to consist of mere brutes. Both races, however, were at most pale imitations of human beings, since neither one had the sensitivities characteristic of a civilized group. Like Aristotle, who stressed habituation as well as philosophical understanding in moral formation, Williams asserts the need for a renewed ethical consciousness that is grounded in feeling as well as intellect. Thus he argues: "If any reader can honestly feel that the gas ovens at Buchenwald were neither right nor wrong, then he is a true relativist. If, on the other hand, he regards such things as innately evil, then, despite the modishness of contemporary ethical relativism, he is still a member of the human race, even if he cannot rationally explain why he regards such things to be evil." As Aristotle knew, it is better to do good without knowing why than to be a clever knave.

Some of Williams' ideas raise questions in my mind. For one thing, his view of literature as a "real, formative social force" assigns to the object of his study an importance that has not been empirically confirmed. After all, no one has thus far demonstrated that the publication of a story or a piece of poetry has caused any actual social change! By the same token, literature may and does influence the particular acts of particular individuals and groups (Mr. Williams likes to point to the spate of suicides among frustrated poets and artists following the appearance of Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther*). But to say that novels and poems can directly remould an entire age or society, or that the operation of cultural forces in general

causal analysis, involves an assumption which no scholar should be willing to concede. What can be conceded is only that popular literature transmits and mirrors cultural and social values and that it therefore provides an indispensable key for their study. Once having made this point, however, I should immediately indicate that it does nothing to give the lie to Professor Williams' other observations, which seem well founded. For, given the truth of his cultural analysis, it makes little difference in terms of the survival of civilization whether nihilistic literature in fact turns readers into nihilists or whether it is written for those already so disposed.

The one conceivable difference that might arise between the protagonists of these two positions concerns a justification for censorship. It is possible that those who assign to literature more of a causative than symptomatic role, might be more inclined to favor restricting what they see as a corrupting form of expression than those who disagree with their perception. And yet, on the other hand, this distinction might not be entirely valid. For, although Williams does view literature as a more crucial social determinant than I do, he is also opposed (unlike myself) to almost every kind of censorship. He stresses the fact that he would rather teach than censor. And teach he does, for at the age of forty-seven with three places of residence and a wife and three children, he continues to cross oceans and continents to urge people to become civilized, and students to read the classics again. Both at Oxford (where he took his degrees) and at the University of London, he was obliged to answer the charges of his

the eighteenth century whole—or, as one lady put it, "with plumbing and all." At Rockford College during the fall, I heard him respond to another extravagant accusation, with his accustomed civility, this one being that he was opposed to the very concept of social and artistic experimentation. "But certainly," he exclaimed, "one need not be against creativity, simply because one opposes the tedious duplication of sexual violence and human despair in literature—or because one gets sick of novels featuring four-letter obscenities on every line."

Since I do enjoy his pungent debating style and resonant Welsh brogue, I have often held discussions with Duncan Williams on the value of censorship. "All right!" I'll start. "Let's take your point that literature is a cause for social and other changes. If that premise is true, then certainly we do have a duty to inhibit whatever forms of expression are intended to turn us into trousered apes. After all, civilization must have some way of protecting itself against its enemies!"

"Yes, I quite agree!" he rejoins. "And that's why I write on education and try to appeal to whomever I can reach. But as for censorship, it will never work unless we succeed in making over this country into one enormous police state. And once we've done that, what do you think will happen? The other side, as soon as it gains political control, will use whatever we've created against us." Thus the give-and-take usually continues at lunch and elsewhere, until our duties summon us back to class. On the next day we resume the discussion without even hoping to resolve our differences, but simply for the pleasure of further debate. □

J. Whitney Stillman

Literature Reconsidered

Very few writers can be considered the world's greatest writer. In fact, at the present time, only one writer is the world's greatest. There are over three billion people on this planet, yet it has produced only one greatest writer. Surely in a juster world there would be more.

For this, and many other reasons, literature today is not held in high regard. Some people don't think much of it. Some people don't think of it much—and others not at all. Yet literature has an undeniable effect on the quality of books we read.

At the heart of literature is the creative act, which is legal in this country. By legal, I mean allowed by law. The world's greatest writer would have to be a creative person—this is the sort of judgment we can make; it would be boorish to say

just who the world's greatest writer is. That is the kind of thing boors would say.

After a laborious survey of local libraries and pharmacies, I have found Isaac Bashevis Singer to be the world's greatest writer.

This said, the whole picture is not a rosy one.

That Isaac Bashevis Singer has three names is bound to cause consternation among many *Alternative* readers. Yet "Singer" was the surname of a famous American industrialist, and many distinguished Americans have been called "Isaac." "Bashevis" remains an enigma, but John Paul Jones had three names, none of them any good.

Another of Singer's liabilities from our point of view is that he fails to deal with the real world as we know it—the inter-

collegiate greek-letter fraternity system. He has likewise failed to paint the plight of the debutante. Beer, bourbon, and diet soft drinks have all been neglected in Singer's work.

Some readers may feel that these facts add up to a powerful literary indictment. Had I not first encountered one of Singer's stories in the *New Yorker* during a well-attended costume party, I would have felt so too. Usually in the *New Yorker*, people (here loosely defined) only read those stories which portray the drama of English country life, have a lot of jokes, or are the work of several authors whose surnames begin with the letter B. However, these pieces are signed only at the end, so that while at this terrific party I was telling you about, I found myself reading a short story (I didn't

know how short) set in a Manhattan cafeteria: it was not until the very end that I realized that the author's surname did not begin with the letter *B* at all. This of course was a very unsettling experience, but I did not want to embarrass my host, so I chose to overlook it. Besides, the author's middle name begins with the letter *B*.

The story was too good to overlook. Using the sophisticated techniques of the so-called new criticism, I have made a study of Singer's fiction. I would now like to share some of my findings with the reading public. To use the close, textual analysis preferred by those of us in the academy, I have selected a representative Singer story for our examination. Entitled "The Third One," it begins as follows:

"It was sweltering outside, but the cafeteria was cool. During the day, between three and five, it was almost empty. I took a table near the wall, drank coffee, nibbled a piece of apple cake, and looked into an occult magazine. In the letters to the editor, a woman wrote that her cat had been run over by a car and she had buried it but still it came to visit her every night. The woman gave her name and her address in a Texas village. There was sincerity in the letter; surely it could not have been made up. But does the astral body really exist? I wonder. And do animals possess it, too? If so, my whole philosophy must be revised."

There is sincerity in this paragraph. The reference to a woman in Texas shows that Singer's work is deep in the American grain. It is difficult for outsiders to realize what reverence Americans have for Texas and its residents. Lyndon Johnson, one of the country's most popular presidents, came from Texas; Davy Crockett died there. Lyndon Johnson died there. The woman's cat died there. Or did it? This is the question Singer poses. If animals really possess the astral body, all our philosophies must be revised.

"Before I could undertake so large an order," the narrator recounts, "I went to the counter and got another cup of coffee." (This is a typical reaction of the Americans, for whom coffee is preeminently the "think drink.")

Shortly a man named Zelig Fingerbein enters the cafeteria and, after pausing to look around, sits down with the narrator, who knows him only vaguely. Although Zelig Fingerbein has a strange name, he is a sort of Everyman. ("Everyman" is itself a strange name; most names are strange.) Like many Everymen, Zelig has a wife—Genia (a pretty woman but strange name)—and his share of troubles, not necessarily in that order. Like all Everymen, he is the protagonist of a story. As Zelig tells the narrator, he gave up literature some years before to become a landlord.

"I used to write poems and I published, too, but who needs poetry today? It's unnecessary merchandise. Still, there are emotions that only a poem can express." Some of the emotions that only poetry can express are rapture, despair, and birthday greetings. But Zelig says

that of the emotions, jealousy is one of the strongest.

"Civilized man has to learn the greatest of all arts: to overcome jealousy." He continues: "Women had to suffer for generations—polygamy, harems, men who came back from war with concubines. Now men will have to take their medicine. Women have the same appetites as we do—maybe bigger." Yet men tend to be more overweight. There are any number of reasons for this.

"No matter how much I loved my wife, I was never indifferent to other women.... I might not have been Byron, but my appetite was as strong as his. You know our milieu. There were always opportunities."

Zelig took advantage of his opportunities to break the Seventh Commandment (Sixth in some books).

"When I finally confessed, [Genia] didn't make a big tragedy out of it. 'Do what you like, only come back to me,' she said. 'No woman can give you what I



can.' Typically feminine talk. I also began to realize that my so-called adventures aroused a new desire in her. Nothing new in that, either."

After some years, Zelig says, "Genia began to insist that there was no basic difference between the psychology of women and men, and she even talked about finding herself a man." There's nothing new in that, either.

"She developed a real complex. Why couldn't she do what Mme. Bovary, Anna Karenina, or your [the narrator's] Hadassa and Clara did? In her shop, the girls kept boasting about their successes.... She started talking in a jargon she picked up from books by doctors and love experts about how backward she was."

Then one time at the Cafe Royal Zelig met a Polish refugee named Max. "He's a painter—that's what he claims, anyway. He makes a few smudges on canvas and it's supposed to be a sunset in Zakopane or a bullfight in Mexico."

Max almost pursued Zelig. He insisted on painting his portrait, which when completed makes him look "half ape, half crocodile." However, Max is more operator than painter, and comes up with every sort of pretext to visit the Fingerbeins. He also seems to be a homosexual: "When Genia spoke to him, he pretended not to hear; when I said even the most trivial thing, he cried out with enthusiasm."

Zelig couldn't stand Max, but Genia seemed jealous of the attention he paid

her husband. She got in the habit of accepting Max's many invitations while Zelig refused them. She and Max went to plays, movies, and exhibitions; they had lunch and supper and would gossip for hours at a time. At first their rendezvous had a "just us girls" flavor but soon they were spending all their time together and as the months went on Zelig started feeling unsettled by it.

Then Genia confessed to him that she and Max were having an affair. "I felt my whole life was destroyed. If I could I would have dragged her to the Sanhedrin and had her stoned—the way they did in ancient times. But there's no Sanhedrin in New York." That night they made many pledges to each other but Genia's affair with Max didn't end. Zelig tells the narrator that it doesn't matter; he has come to the view that in the twentieth century such things must be expected. Civilized man's only choice is to learn to overcome jealousy.

"Lately, I lost patience with everything: with Genia's guilt and with what we call culture. I can't make a fetish out of plays on Broadway and Picasso's paintings. Even good literature doesn't interest me any more. The wall that separates the world from the underworld has become too thin. The judge, the lawyer, and the murderer all nurture the same ideas, read the same books, visit the same nightclubs, talk the same gibberish."

As Zelig finishes his story, the narrator notices that the cafeteria is beginning to fill up with diners. He says they had better leave before the management throws them out.

"We walked out on Broadway and the heat hit me like a furnace," the narrator recounts. "It was still daylight but the neon signs were already lit.... A tepid stench came up from the subway gratings. Over a movie house hung a billboard of a half-naked woman four stories high, lit up by spotlights—her hair disheveled, her eyes wild, her legs spread out, a gun in each hand.... A mob had collected to gape at her. Men made jokes, women giggled. I looked at Zelig. Half his face was green, the other red—like a modern painting...."

(Are red and green valid colors today? We must first achieve a more responsive color spectrum, a saner one.)

"The Third One" will to many readers seem inconclusive. This is because the conclusion has been left out. It can be found in Singer's recent collection, *A Crown of Feathers* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux), which includes both the story's conclusion and the events leading up to it. "The Third One" is probably not one of the best Singer stories, but it appears toward the middle of the book and thus hopefully represents the stories which come before and after it.

The passages quoted from this story are just ones of human interest, so some readers will be disappointed. Yet in these brief passages are many of the characteristic elements of Singer's work. Frequent literary or philosophical references, the

device of short sentences, the imagery drawn from modernist painting, somber parapsychological speculations, his idea of using interesting subject matter. All these are purely Singer touches.

The trouble with these things is that they are only literary and thus not very important. Singer, however, has also made scientific discoveries, comparable to the work Charles Darwin did in this field. (Linnaeus comes to mind as well, because Singer's genius is essentially one of identifying, categorizing, and name-calling—all of which he shares with that master scientist.) Singer in a cafeteria is like Darwin in the Galapagos, but the mutant native species is regrettably our own.

A story entitled "The Third One" is conveniently at hand, so we might as well test it for traces of Singer-Darwinism.

(Singer-Darwinism has nothing to do with Social Darwinism, the theory that parties keep getting better and better. Needless to say, Social Darwinism has been completely discredited in recent years.)

The methodology of Singer-Darwinism has not yet been firmly established. As investigators we will have to make up our own rules as we go along, like Freud in the early years. Genia Fingerbein, one of the story's principal characters, is ostensibly an aging beauty in her fifties—probably a foreigner, perhaps atheistic. Yet she has many of the traits of a freshman (sophomore?) coed at one of our American universities: "There was Genia," Zelig Fingerbein—her husband—tells the story's narrator, "walking around like a sort of holy virgin. She started talking in a jargon she picked up from books by doctors and love experts about how backward she was."

"Don't laugh, but Genia demanded my help in getting a lover. Isn't that crazy? She said, 'I can't do it without you. Find someone for me.' She wanted just once to taste what being 'progressive' is like. One night we sat down and actually wrote out a whole list of candidates."

In Dunster and Adams Houses of Harvard University—and probably elsewhere—many young women students, some with marks in the A's, spend their dinner hours worrying, out loud, over similar questions: "Am I repressed, frigid? Have I an Electra complex? An Antigone complex? Do I read too many Greek plays?" Without having taken the same courses it is often difficult to answer these questions, or even understand them. Besides, their dining-hall confessions have other concerns to worry them: "Is verbal diarrhea contagious? Can it be prevented?"

Many of Singer's characters are marked by a similar kind of "orality." They talk and talk. Take a story entitled "The Third One," for example. One of the principal characters, Zelig Fingerbein, is a frustrated poet who likes to compare himself with the great romantics ("In my circumstances, Lord Byron would have become a landlord, too"). He tells the story's narrator, only a vague

acquaintance, many of his most personal experiences, such as the time an abstract painter named Max tried to kiss him and he replied: "Max, don't make a fool of yourself. I'm as far from that sort of madness as Heaven is from Hell." The emotional highpoint of his history—told as if he were in an intense, marathon kind of psychiatric interview—is when Zelig blurts out to the narrator that his wife Genia has been having an affair with the same Max. There is a pause in the text, then the narrator reports:

"Zelig Fingerbein finished off his cold coffee in one gulp. He looked at me reproachfully. 'Why are you so shocked? You write like a modern man, but here you are with the old morals and prejudices. I had them once, but I freed myself....'"

In this passage the narrator apparently says nothing, but Zelig jumps to the conclusion that he is "shocked" at the story because of his "old morals and preju-

Although Singer has kept his old morals and prejudices, he does not write like a modern man, but chooses instead to use a pen.

dices." Here Zelig is projecting or transferring onto the narrator feelings he himself has but cannot tolerate. When this form of psychiatric transference takes place in New York City it is known as "Manhattan Transfer."

Although Singer has kept his old morals and prejudices, he does not write like a modern man, choosing instead to use a pen. The stories he has written by pen can be divided into three general types, each roughly corresponding to a phase of his life. The most recent ones tend to deal with his experiences since he came to this country in 1935. Besides "The Third One," good examples are "Alone," "Property," "The Beard," or—to sum them up—"A Day in Coney Island." For these the cafeteria is a persistent motif.

The first and so far predominant type of Singer story stems from the world of his youth, particularly the years he spent in the small, virtually medieval, Polish village of Bilgoray as it held off—quite successfully—against the ravages of World War I and eighteenth-century intellectual currents. Good examples of this phase are stories like "The Destruction of Kreshev," "Big and Little," or "Yentl the Yeshiva Boy." The theme in the most of these is explicitly religious, although sometimes a demon steps in as narrator to vary point-of-view.

The middle phase of stories is less well-defined. They are frequently set in Warsaw and peopled with a sophisticated

Yiddish intelligentsia. "A Quotation from Klopstock," "The Magazine," and "A Friend of Kafka" are all representative. This type of story, with its seedy roués and Cervantic philosophers, perhaps most closely resembles what life is believed to be like in the hereafter.

But what about the novel, that broad canvas of life? Singer has painted seven novels. Unfortunately, novels are by definition too long to be much good. No one could possibly have enough interesting things to say to fill up a whole novel. Some people might cite Tolstoy as an example to the contrary, but they had better reread *War and Peace*—pages 63, 239, 678, 951, and 1311.

The obvious alternative to the novel, then, is the short story—but the rules for this genre were set over half a century ago by Henry James and James Joyce, two failed novelists. James said that the short story should be dramatized, but then it would be a short play. Joyce thought that each story should be a sort of "epiphany," which sounds very High Church, even fruity. Perhaps he meant that authors should only write short stories on January 6, and use the rest of the year to collect material. If Joyce had gone to church more often himself, maybe he would have been a better writer.

This is not necessarily so. Excessive religious worship could take away from those vital hours the writer needs to think up his stories, and later erase them. Many people are highly skeptical of religion. To some, it is a miserable superstition, a weakness verging on altruism. Others, while admitting that religion was once the opiate of the masses, now say that it is too inefficient, as it cannot be injected directly into the bloodstream. From their point of view, Singer's devotion to the Ten Commandments seems garish, not quite right, or in poor taste. But what's wrong with the Ten Commandments? Few great books film well. It is also important to keep in mind that religious worship is still legal in this country.

From the Bible's first half, Singer takes much of the style and structure of his stories, adding the best parts of several other styles. In a sense he writes compressed novels, cutting out the traditional several hundred pages padding. Singer has the ability to represent sensual impressions dramatically and tersely, so that he doesn't become boring about them (in this regard he is unique among *New Yorker* writers). Although old-fashioned in the medieval sense, he is in other ways very much a man of our time (the subject of sex is often mentioned in his work). There is also his way with words.

But how is he ideologically? That's what is most important, of course. Singer holds that there is a difference between right and wrong, to use legal jargon. In this he differs from Darwin. Singer resolved to tell the new species he would encounter that although deformed they were not all good. Perhaps this makes him greater than Darwin. Darwin was British. □

Our Men in Havana?

In 1962, the year of the Soviet-American confrontation in the Cuban missile crisis, Congress passed legislation designed to prevent "the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of the Western hemisphere." Congress also passed legislation prohibiting American assistance to Cuba or any country which assisted Cuba. In a further effort to isolate Cuba the Organization of American States voted to expel Cuba from its membership, and the OAS countries also voted to sever all trade and diplomatic relations between member states and Cuba. Until recently all OAS members but Mexico complied with the decision.

During the intervening years, however, changing global power relations and particularly the alleged change in relations between the world's superpowers, have given new momentum for a change in U.S.-Cuban relations.

Since 1971 a number of Senators, including Fulbright, Church, Mathias, Kennedy, and Pell, and Congressmen including Massachusetts Democrat Michael Harrington, have introduced legislation seeking a normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba.

Speculation that a change in U.S.-Cuban relations was imminent increased further in 1974 when Gerald Ford became President. The pundits suggested that President Ford might want to initiate some major foreign policy overture of his own; he needed to escape from the shadows of Nixon's diplomatic legacy, and Cuba was the logical choice. The new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Sparkman (D.-Ala.), has recently added his voice to those calling for such overtures. Moreover, other countries in the hemisphere, for reasons of their own, seemed to want normalized relations with Cuba. An indication of their shift in attitude came when the Latin American Caucus of the United Nations, which had isolated Cuba from the group for over a decade, permitted Cuba to resume participation in January.

Just this last November, in Ecuador, the OAS almost repealed its trade embargo against Cuba. Twelve of the twenty-one voting delegates favored repeal, only two votes short of the necessary two-thirds majority. (The United States abstained, both out of sensitivity to the wishes of our hemispheric neighbors and out of fear of causing an uproar in Congress.) Given American reluctance to take a strong stand, it seems only a matter of time—probably no later than the April 1975 meeting of OAS foreign ministers in Washington—before hemispheric policy toward Cuba changes.

In general, the new spirit of reconciliation vis-à-vis Cuba is not so much the result of any policy shift on the part of Castro and the Soviet Union—indeed in every official pronouncement Castro has continued to reaffirm adherence to those policies which resulted in the Soviet-American confrontation, and which led to Cuba's expulsion from the OAS—as it is the result of the ambiguities of detente. If the Communist nations of the world no longer appear to be the threat they once were then the logical conclusion can only be that the power relations of the early postwar period are antiquated and designed for an era now bygone.

Early in 1974 U.S. supporters of normalized U.S.-Cuban relations began to make a concerted effort for their case, with the hope of influencing the U.S. government to vote for an end to Cuba's exclusion from the OAS at the Ecuador meeting last November. Pat Holt, J. William Fulbright's Chief of Staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee obtained a visa to visit Cuba and subsequently prepared a staff report which was generally sympathetic to Castro and which urged a change in U.S.-Cuban relations.

Shortly after the Holt visit sympathetic American newsmen were also permitted to enter Cuba, including former McGovern campaign manager Frank Mankiewicz, as were U.S. Senators Javits and Pell. They were unanimous in their pronouncements: The time has come for a change in U.S.-Cuban relations.

On a congressional level initial steps in this direction have already been undertaken. Senator Fulbright introduced major legislation (Senate Bill 3880) in the Ninety-third Congress which would repeal the major anti-Cuba legislation of the early sixties. Fulbright's eagerness for a resumption of normal relations with Cuba is, needless to say, not shared by all his colleagues. A number of Senators, including Buckley, Byrd (Va.), Gurney, Helms, and McClure have all spoken on the floor of the U.S. Senate to warn against precipitous U.S. action.

As possibly the only member in the U.S. Senate to know Cuba well from personal experience, including a stay in Cuba as a newspaper correspondent when Castro came to power, Senator Harry Byrd (Ind.-Va.) has begun to speak out on what the possible result of a change in U.S.-Cuban relations might be.

Although proponents of normalized U.S.-Cuban relations assert that U.S. policy has failed to isolate Cuba, and that the changing international environment makes our present policy inadequate, Byrd believes that few critics seem willing to ask what the U.S. stands to gain from a resumption of relations with Cuba, and what the long-term consequences

would be for the exiled free Cubans.

The U.S. interest in discussing a change in relations with Cuba is predicated upon Castro's reported willingness to talk to Secretary of State Kissinger if the economic embargo against Cuba is unconditionally lifted. But a number of critics, including Byrd, do not believe that the embargo should be lifted as a prelude to negotiations. Byrd argues that if Cuba is interested in trade with the United States, and in access to our money market, the U.S. should not give away the only leverage it has without getting something in return.

Concessions Byrd and others would like to see include a compensation for the confiscation of U.S. property (The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission has certified claims of losses by American citizens totalling \$1.8 billion), freer access to the news media representatives of their respective countries, greater freedom of movement between the two peoples, and an easing of Cuba's internal repression. Byrd also rejects out of hand Castro's demand that the U.S. surrender Guantanamo, an American naval base on the island.

Until recently the United States had insisted that improved relations would come only if Cuba were to cease interfering in the internal affairs of the other American states, and to sever close political and military ties with the Soviet Union. Although this U.S. position seems to have shifted, many congressional figures are nevertheless concerned about Soviet-Cuban behavior.

In 1970 the Soviet Union established a nuclear submarine base in Cienfuegos, in violation of an agreement with the United States not to deploy strategic offensive weapons on the island. Without revealing any details President Nixon in 1971 stated that in the event nuclear submarines were serviced in Cuba, or from Cuba, it would be considered a violation of the U.S.-Soviet understanding. In the name of detente, however, the United States appears willing to swallow much.

According to recently published sources, only one month after the Nixon warning a Soviet nuclear submarine sailed into Cienfuegos. The Soviets have continued to violate the agreement regularly ever since—and there has been no protest from the U.S. This lack of protest has come to be regarded as an acceptance of the Russian conduct, and it has raised increasing concern in Congress. As Senator Byrd has argued, the "Soviet submarine visits to Cuba illustrate just how shallow detente is," and he continues, "If the Soviet Union persists in violating agreements there can be no detente."

Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, of little more than a decade ago, the Soviet Union has become a Caribbean power, with

bases only ninety miles from the United States. And this development has emerged at a time when efforts are increasing (supported by the Soviet Union) to evict the U.S. from the Panama Canal Zone.

The new Soviet presence in the Caribbean gives the Soviet Union more substantial advantages than just its immediate strategic gains. As Mr. Morris Rothenberg, of the Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, has recognized:

"The Soviet presence in Cuba... strengthens the image of Soviet power in the overall East-West context. It reinforces the impression of a Soviet counterweight to the United States in Latin America and provides a physical capability for Soviet access to

other areas of the continent....

"The consolidation of Communist rule in Cuba strengthens the legitimacy and aspirations of the Soviet regime itself. It is used perhaps more than any other single development to demonstrate to the Soviet people and the rest of the world the validity of the Soviet claim that victorious communism is irreversible and is indeed the 'wave of the future.'

"The basic issue the U.S. has to face up to is whether it is best to accept that the Soviet camel is already in the tent and has to be lived with on its own terms, or to continue a difficult, and in political terms perhaps increasingly costly effort to discredit the animal in the hope of minimizing his potential for damage."

The argument that the U.S. should be willing to make almost any sacrifice to

give Communist nations a greater stake in continued and improved relations with the United States has proven to be increasingly costly and futile. Such a policy can only undermine U.S. credibility and consequently lead to a more adventurous policy on the part of our adversaries in the international arena. As the U.S. moves towards a normalization of relations with Cuba it would, therefore, serve us well to consider the words of Senator Harry Byrd:

"We cannot afford to delude ourselves about the nature of Castro's regime...nor should we underestimate the challenge to American security that exists because of Soviet-Cuban ties....Castro must drastically change his ways if the United States is to change its present policy toward Cuba...."

David L. Schaefer

Democratic Statesmanship and Morality

Immediately after Richard Nixon's resignation from the Presidency, the editors of *Newsweek* solicited the reactions of several prominent citizens to the event, including those of Harvard's best-known social-critic-in-residence, John Kenneth Galbraith. Galbraith's pronouncements on that occasion, hastily as they may have been composed, are worthy of being reconsidered, for they illustrate and embody in a frank manner the premises which underlie the analyses that many liberal commentators have presented of *l'affaire* Nixon and the lessons to be learned from it. Serious issues of public policy, transcending the recent Presidential crisis, hinge on whether these premises are correct.

"While Mr. Nixon's going is good and a definite boost to the Republic," Galbraith lamented, "we will suffer for it in the days ahead. That is because his departure will bring out all that is loathsome in our literary tradition. There will now be a drawing of morals until healthy stomachs retch. Someone, I promise you, will say that the fault lies deeply within ourselves. Well, the hell it does. It lies with Richard Nixon and the people who voted him into office."

If the last sentence were to be taken literally, it would imply that Galbraith holds a large proportion of the American electorate responsible for the Nixon debacle. But this is not quite what he means. While a majority of the voters made an error in judgment by not appreciating the virtues of George McGovern sufficiently to elect him to the Presidency, neither this error nor the overall corruption of the Nixon Administration, in Galbraith's view, were truly the fault of the people. The scandals of Watergate, I.T.T., the Ellsburge, etc., are rather the

result of the particular viciousness of a single leader and his cohorts, supported by those Galbraith calls "the privileged of the Republic," who helped install into office a man they knew to be corrupt rather than vote for his democratic opponent, whose policies they perceived to represent "a threat to their personal wealth and comfort." The mass of the voters gave Mr. Nixon his landslide victory in 1972 because they were deceived by the wealthy and insufficiently warned by the "mealy-mouthed" news media. The character of the people is not to be questioned; if they are to be criticized for anything, it is for allowing themselves to be taken in by others.

A Curious Double Standard

To the man in the street, and to those intellectuals who hold, with John Dewey, that "the cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy," Galbraith's analysis may be a comforting one. Men always find troubles easier to bear when the blame for them can be fixed on a discrete group of individuals other than themselves (hence, the recurrent popularity in this century of "devil" theories as explanations of wars and depressions). Moreover, in a nation founded on the principle of the consent of the governed, to contend that the character of the people themselves was a contributory cause of such scandals as Watergate may seem downright disloyal. No wonder that Galbraith, the ardent exponent of a fashionable egalitarianism, finds the self-questioning elements of America's literary tradition to be "loathsome." To doubt the inherent virtue and wisdom of the common man is simply to fall victim

to antiquated prejudices that should long ago have been discarded.

Still, one must wonder: is Galbraith's explanation of governmental corruption really sufficient? To doubt its adequacy, one need only reflect on the standards of behavior common today among persons other than the "privileged" few at whom Galbraith points an accusing finger. Consider the growing crime rate, including the widespread practice and expectation of "petty" crimes like shoplifting. Consider the blameworthy practices generally accepted as inevitable in all walks of American life: cheating by students as well as businessmen; "featherbedding" and minor theft by both blue- and white-collar workers; welfare fraud by the poor and the not-so-poor, and dishonest Medicaid billing by physicians; expense account padding and the misuse of "influence" at lower as well as upper levels of government, business, and the educational and "nonprofit" institutions. The sum and nature of these crimes and malpractices is surely not yet of a sort to make America one of the world's great hotbeds of sin. But it does cause one to doubt whether the average American, placed in the same situation and given the same opportunities as were Mr. Nixon and his associates, could be counted on to act much more morally or lawfully than they did. If that doubt is justified, is it not hypocritical to condemn the President for behaving like a large number of his countrymen, while one does not dare to criticize the latter?

Professor Galbraith's one-sided analysis of the Nixon scandals is symptomatic of a curious double standard that infects much contemporary social criticism in this country. Many of the same observers who most heatedly denounce the Nixon

Administration's disregard for the law, in pursuit of what the President and his cohorts perceived to be essential to the nation's well-being—his own re-election—supported the practice of "civil disobedience," based on a principle that elevates every citizen's private judgment above the law, when it was practiced by opponents of the Vietnam war a couple of years earlier. It is held to be outrageous that the Central Intelligence Agency should have exceeded its legal mandate in maintaining surveillance of domestic radicals; but the much more serious crimes of murder, rape, and theft committed by individuals every day are explained away or even excused by reference to the supposed social, economic, or psychological "causes" of crime. Violations of the antitrust laws by businessmen are evidence of a heinous intent to oppress the people; but cheating by workers, students, public employees, or welfare recipients is merely a symptom of a justified "alienation" from "the system."

In defense of the double standard as applied to the government, it may be argued that a public office is a public trust, and that it is the responsibility of a government official to set a higher example for his fellow citizens, rather than merely reflecting the common denominator of their conduct. Weighty as this argument is, however, it does not support Galbraith's position, because it is irreconcilable with another implication of that position: the contention, widely expressed in the wake of Watergate, that good government is identical with "responsive" government, or government that "represents" the people in the sense of mirroring their wants and dispositions. If we are not entitled to criticize the character of the general populace, and if Nixon's failure can be wholly explained by his insufficient conformity to their wants, then we can hardly blame him at the same time for *sharing* their dispositions. There is a conflict, in other words, between Galbraith's egalitarianism and his refusal to hold the ordinary man to the same standard that he applies to the government and the "privileged few."

The view that the major source of danger to the maintenance of free government is the selfish and conspiratorial ambitions of the few is a familiar theme in American history. Galbraith's denunciations of the wealthy and the powerful bring to mind the similar rhetoric of the New Deal, the Populist movement, Jefferson, and the Antifederalists. But if Galbraith's warnings against the few are a customary piece of democratic rhetoric, the loathing he feels toward any questioning of the character of the many is less typical of the tradition of American political thought. In the writings of the Antifederalists, Jefferson, and the early Civil Service reformers, the battle against the privileged and powerful is generally linked with an explicit concern for maintaining habits of morality, law abidingness, and good citizenship among the populace at large. As Galbraith's remarks

indicate, moreover, there is a powerful self-questioning strain in American literature that is directed at the popular character. Our great writers like Mark Twain teach us that there is a vast difference between moralism and morality, and that it is all too easy for a democratic populace to self-righteously condemn others without examining their own motives and conduct. Only in recent years has it become unfashionable for intellectuals to question the character of the people, leaving the banner of law abidingness and good citizenship to be waved largely by pious hypocrites of the sort who occupied many of the chief positions in the Nixon Administration.

It is undoubtedly true that these officials did more damage, by their personal deeds, to the cause of "law and order" than they ever may have helped it by their rhetoric. But the American people may be harmed far more, in the long run, by the kind of flattering propaganda that is now being shoveled at them in the wake of Watergate by social critics who share Galbraith's orientation. The danger is not merely that blaming "the few" for all the country's problems will deter the many from feeling much responsibility for their own conduct. Even more harm is likely to result from the current use of the Nixon affair by those intellectuals who shape public opinion, as an excuse to arouse class hatred through one-sided and intemperate denunciations of "the privileged," and to foist a variety of political patent medicines on the country as a supposed cure for the ills of the government. The American people are being encouraged to view themselves as a flock of innocent sheep who suffer from inflation, taxes, crime, and assorted other misfortunes only because of the machinations of a designing few and the refusal of government to act more "responsively" to the popular will. Every feature of the political system that is not simply majoritarian, such as the seniority system and the Electoral College, is now attacked as being somehow the "cause" of governmental corruption. "Reforms" like the campaign financing bill are urged on the country with little consideration either of their Constitutionality or their long-range political effect. The people's willingness to accept the duties, burdens, and problems that are inseparable from any political order is steadily being eroded, and they are being fed a dangerous diet of political oversimplification and utopianism.

The Need for Moral Leadership

As many commentators have argued, the Nixon scandals reveal the great need for moral leadership on the part of the government if the people's trust and confidence in American institutions is to be restored. Unfortunately, the unqualifiedly egalitarian premises with which most contemporary analysts begin have caused them to misconceive the nature of such leadership. Political morality has been presented as if it were primarily a

passive or negative quality—the disposition to "respond" to the popular will as rapidly as possible or to avoid accepting bribes. In this respect, current views of morality in government resemble the crude understanding of "loyalty" that was propagated during the McCarthy era, when the mere negative quality of being opposed to Communism and untainted by past association with it was made to seem the essence of good citizenship and devoted public service. Neither morality nor loyalty, thus understood, will suffice to produce the requisite leadership, even when they are combined with intelligence and technical expertise. As Hamilton teaches us in nos. 70-72 of *The Federalist*, free government requires leaders of sufficient nobility of character to pursue the long-range good of the country, resisting transient popular passions that conflict with that good, even at the cost of the people's censure. While the direct or indirect dependence of all public officials on popular election insures that "the deliberate sense of the community" will ultimately determine the policies that the government pursues, such responsibility cannot be equated with a "servile pliancy" or an "unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests." The demagogic flattery of the people's fluctuating passions is a much greater political sin, and one requiring far more virtue to resist, than accepting bribes. The Hamiltonian statesman would despise the techniques that Nixon employed to insure his reelection, not because this statesman is "responsive," but because he is too proud to stoop to such devices.

The need for moral leadership on the part of the government extends beyond the President and concerns the character of his subordinates as well. Beginning with Woodrow Wilson, American political scientists have long pursued and advocated the ideal of a technically competent but politically "neutral" civil service, one that would effectuate the popular "will," as expressed by Congress and/or the President, as rapidly and efficiently as possible. The Watergate affair should have taught us the error of such an approach. To be purely "neutral" with respect to policy (as opposed to party) matters, a public official must be morally obtuse, and devoid of the substantive concern with *ends* that would provide him with an incentive to do his work honestly and conscientiously. The administrator who has been trained to view himself as a mere tool for the "implementation" of policy is not likely to display much courage in resisting the corrupt demands of a political superior, or fighting against the tendencies to corruption that arise from within the bureaucracy itself. He is even less likely to seek positively to benefit his country rather than just satisfying the minimal "requirements" of his job and working toward a promotion by currying his superiors' favor. If the

federal civil service is to be expected to display qualities of dedication, morality, and public concern, it must rather be infused with a spirit of *sharing* in the President's responsibility for securing the national well-being. "Responsiveness" is no more a sufficient criterion for judging the civil service than it is an adequate measure of Presidential performance. In this respect, we may learn from the example of the much admired British civil service. While adapting to the policy mandates of changing governments, higher British administrative officials have also been viewed as rightly participating in the making of policy, and even as educating their political superiors. American civil servants also share in the policymaking process, of course; but the way they have been taught to view their duties has encouraged them to become complaisant servants either of the President or of the particular interest groups with which they deal. Perhaps the Hoover Commission's recommendation of a Senior Civil Service (a form of which was proposed by Mr. Nixon, but rejected by Congress) would, if adopted, contribute to the development of a greater permanence, *esprit de corps*, and sense of responsibility for the public interest on the part of the American bureaucracy. But a more obvious and fundamental way to improve the character of the civil service would be to revise the teaching of public administration in this country. Instead of concentrating on the learning of pseudoscientific "techniques of management," which supposedly work equally well in any organization (but which, studies have shown, really are perceived by civil servants to be of little use in their work), the future public administrator needs to engage in studies that will prepare him to exercise *political* responsibility. He needs to learn both the principles of free government and the difficulties it entails. The best source for such an education is not textbooks of "administrative behavior" or "organization theory" that treat private and public administration as essentially identical, but the study of public law, of American political thought, and of political biographies and autobiographical writings of great statesmen.

The deficiencies of the contemporary study of public administration in this country reflect the more general defectiveness of the understanding of free government that is set forth by our most prominent social scientists and social critics. By teaching that the test of good government is its responsiveness to the majority will, and by encouraging citizens to think of their rights but not of their duties, these thinkers undermine our awareness of the *problematic* character of democracy, and hence undermine our ability to preserve this regime. As we learn from political thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, Rousseau, and the Antifederalists, the perpetuation of a popular form of government depends not only on the ability of its leaders, but also on the maintenance of a spirit of morality, dedi-

cation to the common good, and a willingness to bear the duties of citizenship—even in a time of hardship much greater than any that we now face—on the part of the people themselves. Even though the American regime was designed, in accordance with the teachings of Locke and Montesquieu, to reduce the demands on the citizen as compared with the directly self-governing republics of antiquity, it cannot survive as a free government if its citizens are concerned only with their immediate wants, and if its elected leaders conceive of their duty as merely one of "responsiveness."

Lincoln's Foresight

Of all American statesmen, the one who reflected most profoundly on the moral preconditions of free government was Abraham Lincoln. By his teaching as well as his example, Lincoln demonstrated that the leader of a democracy must be something more than a man of the people. In the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln reminds his countrymen that free government is a rare and fragile human creation, the success of which depends on their character and their devotion to their country. But whence are such qualities to be derived? Long before the Civil War, but at a time when a thoughtful man could already foresee the danger that the United States would be torn apart by the fanatical self-righteousness of opposing political factions, Lincoln warned in his Springfield address of 1837 that the preservation of the country required not only a "general intelligence" but a "sound morality and, in particular, a reverence for the Constitution and laws." Great as their work had been, Lincoln suggested, the Founding Fathers had not sufficiently provided for the inculcation of these qualities in the citizenry. The Founders had concerned themselves primarily with the right construction of *institutions*, and had relied on men's self-interests to tie them to the government. But the preservation of the regime they had created would require something more: it needed statesmen who, like Lincoln, would serve as teachers of the citizenry, and would institute and perpetuate among them a "political religion" of reverence for law and Constitution that could overarch the bands of interest with those of duty.

The power of government to teach and mold public opinions and attitudes is one that is now shared in our society, to a degree unparalleled in history, by intellectuals: the journalists, television commentators, authors, and university professors who speak and write about public affairs without having the responsibility for the conduct of those affairs. Unfortunately, their understanding of statesmanship and of the preconditions of free government is often a far cry from Lincoln's. It is in fact remarkable to observe in retrospect how the deservedly maligned Mr. Nixon, despite his noted anti-intellectualism, followed in many of his actions and policies the teachings of the very social scientists and intellectuals

who are now most vehement in condemning him. Nixon's unremitting solicitude for his public "image," as measured by opinion polls, and for demonstrating that he had a popular "mandate" by achieving the largest possible margin of victory in the 1972 election, were surely encouraged by the mass media, which attach such importance to polls, and by intellectuals who view responsiveness to the expressed popular "will" as the primary criterion of Presidential performance. Such teachings strengthen in Presidents the very attitude against which Hamilton warned: a concern with immediate popularity, rather than with the long-range well-being of the country. In other respects, too, Nixon followed the precepts of recent political science. In his constant efforts to increase his power, and in his obsessive concern with achieving a place in "history" (as exemplified by the fantastic notion of recording every word of conversation in the Oval Office), Mr. Nixon may well have been inspired by a reading of such works as Richard Neustadt's influential classic, *Presidential Power*. It is Neustadt who urges Presidents to engage in "an unremitting search for personal power," and suggests that the only objective criterion for judging the uses to which a President puts this power is, not the extent to which his policies advance the ends of the Constitution, but merely their agreement with the ever-shifting "grain of history." The lack of serious attention to the Constitution and its ends was, in fact, one of the most notable characteristics of contemporary political science until Nixon's near-impeachment. Even with respect to the Supreme Court, when our recent President asserted as the primary criterion for his judicial appointments the extent of a potential nominee's agreement with his political views, his thinking was fully in accordance with the teachings of the legal "realist" movement that has dominated law schools and political science departments in recent decades. According to this school of thought, judicial opinions can never be more than expressions of the judges' arbitrary "preferences"; the reasoning embodied in such opinions is merely a rationalization of prejudices; and, consequently, the true test of a Supreme Court Justice is the attractiveness of his ideological principles, rather than the intellectual rigor and reflectiveness of his Constitutional interpretation. On what grounds, then, could scholars who had set forth this doctrine when more "liberal" Justices sat on the Court object when Mr. Nixon sought to appoint judges like Harold Carswell, whose prejudices were more to his liking, despite Carswell's intellectual deficiencies? They were no more entitled to criticize such appointments than the previous advocates of "civil disobedience" could with any consistency object to Mr. Nixon's own disregard for the law.


The Nixon affair can be understood only in relation to the broader problems of the character of the American people and of the defective understanding of

democratic government that has been propagated by our most prominent contemporary social critics and political scientists. Many of the diagnoses that have been offered of the affair, like Galbraith's, reflect an extreme narrowness of perspective, and most of the remedies that have been proposed would at best be inefficacious and at worst would exacerbate the causes that contributed to it.

These causes include the diminishing sense of responsibility and respect for law on the part of the populace as well as some members of the government, the obscuring of the difference between Constitutional democracy and simple majoritarianism, and the misapprehension of the nature of democratic statesmanship. If our recent Presidential crisis should be an occasion for a moral self-examination

by the American people, it ought equally to give rise to an intellectual re-examination by American social scientists and social critics of the premises of their political analyses, and particularly to a serious reconsideration of the thought and statesmanship of men like Lincoln and Hamilton. Should any of these events occur, Watergate will not, after all, have been bugged in vain. □

The Talkies



by
**Benjamin
Stein**

Lacombe, Lucien

It is the summer of 1944 in Nazi-occupied France, hundreds of miles from where the invading allies and the Germans are slugging it out. In a tiny farming village, a seventeen-year-old boy returns to his home to find that his mother has taken up with another man and that this man does not want him around. The boy does not want to return to his job in a nearby province capital as an attendant at a nursing home. So he tries to join the Maquis—the Resistance.

The local leader of the Maquis, a schoolteacher, turns him down curtly. The boy is too young. He feels lost and homeless.

As he rides his bicycle back to the nursing home, he passes through a town and sees a gaily lit hotel with pretty, heavily made-up girls in a window through which dance music is floating.

In an instant, he sees, and we in the audience see, that for a boy like him, he is looking at paradise—a place that is warm and bright and luxurious amidst a cold, dark, and rude existence. But the place he has stumbled upon is the local headquarters of the French collaborators' auxiliary to the Gestapo.

The boy is taken inside and is treated considerably and with kindness. He is taken into the very bosom of the collaborators and within hours is telling them about the schoolteacher who is a resistance leader. Lucien Lacombe, so accustomed to being treated as a cipher that he routinely gives his last name first—Lacombe, Lucien—has found a home.

The home is with murderers and swine, but it is a home. In that sequence, which begins *Lacombe, Lucien*, the cryptic French director Louis Malle has given us a clear and beautifully filmed insight into the motivations of people who join organizations that most of us find repellent. Indeed, it is an insight into why people join any organizations at all.

Lucien Lacombe is not Sartre or Camus. He is a boorish peasantly clod. All his life he has been on the outside, on the bottom rungs of society. Suddenly, by throwing in his lot with the Nazis, he turns the tables on the society that has treated him with so little notice. Instead of being a figure of pity, he is a figure of dread. He gets the respect born of fear instead of the disregard that characterized all his former life.

What Malle is showing us then is not how a suave and worldly person would respond to the temptations of joining an evil fraternity, but how a virtual animal would feel. And there were and are plenty of Lucien Lacombes in the world.

If Malle had just shown us that stage of Lucien Lacombe's life, he would have been doing us an informative service and he would have had a neat twenty-five-minute short subject. But the film is much longer and says a lot more.

The Gestapo—French division—is desperate for recruits, what with the war clearly turning against them, so they give Lacombe authority and a fairly free rein. He falls in with a slothful and vicious pro-Nazi French nobleman who plays murderous tricks on people and tries to act gallant while he is a butcher. The nobleman takes him to a formerly famous Paris tailor, a Jew who has been hiding out in the province town for the whole war and from whom the nobleman has been extorting money while getting elegant suits of clothes. He has a suit made for Lacombe, the first the boy has ever owned.

(The scene where the tailor delivers the suit to Lacombe is the best scene in the film. The tailor gives the suit to Lacombe and tells him that the suit has golf pants, which the tailor always considers more elegant for a young man. Lacombe, in the barely controlled frenzy of hatred and fear that the uncivilized poor feel for the

world of those who wear golf pants, and in genuine ignorance, asks, through clenched teeth, "What are golf pants?" The look of rage and confusion on his face, and the look of despair and confusion on the face of the tailor when he realizes he is reduced to making clothes for people who do not know what clothes are, are masterpieces of acting and direction.)

As fate would have it, the tailor has a beautiful daughter whose first name is France. The alternately wheedling and bullying Lacombe pays her visits and tries to be nice to her, while her father—terrified and yet contemptuous—slowly falls apart. Lacombe takes France, played by the anemic-looking yet lovely Aurore Clement, to a party at the Gestapo headquarters.

When a cleaning lady who had briefly been Lacombe's lover spots the two together she calls France a great many vile, anti-Semitic names. France runs away and when Lacombe finds her she buries her face in his neck and cries. "I'm so sick of being a Jew," she wails over and over.

And again, Malle has shown us an extremely intelligent insight into a facet of human character. When people are persecuted and tormented because of something about them, even if that something is, by any decent standard, nothing to be ashamed of, eventually there comes a time, even if it is fleeting, when the persecuted long to change, to lose that distinguishing stigma.

Again, the girl France is not Golda Meir or Helen Keller. She is just a frightened teenage girl who knows that her life has been wrecked because she is a Jew. She knows she can blame it on the anti-Semites, but she also knows it would not have happened if she were not a Jew. She longs to blend into the large, unpersecuted mass.

And here is the beauty of the coming together of the swinish Lacombe and the lovely and delicate France: he wishes to be lifted out of the herd and she wishes for nothing more than to sink into it. They more or less pass each other on their way up and down.

There is more to *Lacombe, Lucien*, especially the elegant and bizarre suicidal behavior of France's father and the

dawning decency of Lacombe when he saves France's life shortly after raping her.

The movie is marvelously well acted. That means, of course, that it is marvelously well directed. Unfortunately, the movie is about 135 minutes long, and could have done everything it had to do in an hour and a half. Malle is too fond of the slow, slow, slow motion of life, even

evil life. He has too few cuts. He lingers too long on a scene—well beyond the point at which we get the message.

Still, the film is a beauty and full of thought. It tells us something about ourselves and why we do things that we are not proud of, and yet it does so without preaching and moralizing. It is overly long but it is an extremely lucid and lovely parable. □

Book Review/George Nash

Beleaguered Tory

In a line that some conservatives like to quote, T.S. Eliot once remarked that there is no such thing as a lost cause, for there is no such thing as a *gained* cause. History is contingent, he seemed to be saying, and the fortunes of nations can change in the most drastic ways. Eliot's statement is not, of course, literally and invariably true; the past of every country is strewn with causes that are irrecoverable. But there is a sense in which his aphorism is shrewd indeed: if causes can be defeated on the plains of history, they are seldom extinguished in the realm of historiography. Few causes are so forlorn that they will not one day find someone to defend them—with the pen, if not the sword. Hopes may fade and dreams may wither, but the arguments of historians go on for generations.

One such "lost cause" which is increasingly receiving sympathetic understanding, if not defense, is that of one of the most despised minorities in American history: the Loyalists who were crushed in the Revolution. It is a fact too little known outside historical circles that the drive for independence, 1775-1783, was opposed by at least one-fifth of the American population. So fierce, so unremitting was the struggle that as many as 80,000 Loyalists—those who stood by Great Britain—were eventually driven into exile. Despite their obvious importance, the Loyalists have until lately been rather neglected by historians. On the very eve of the nation's two-hundredth birthday, however, scholarly work on this subject has blossomed. Just as we are preparing to celebrate our victorious Revolution, the "lost cause" of Loyalism is enjoying a revival. So noticeable is this current interest in the losers that one colonial historian, Pauline Maier, has observed wryly, "The Loyalists lost the Revolution, but they seem to be winning the Bicentennial." T.S. Eliot, one suspects, would have savored the irony.

Of the proliferating recent studies of Loyalists, one of the most impressive is Bernard Bailyn's biography of the most important one of all: Thomas Hutchinson, the last native-born colonial governor of Massachusetts. Already highly regarded

for *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* and *The Origins of American Politics*, Professor Bailyn has turned in his latest work to a study of the principal *bête noire* of John Adams and thousands of other Revolutionaries. For more than a decade Bailyn has immersed himself in the tracts and pamphlets of the men who forged the independence movement and has become an outstanding authority on the ideology of the Revolution. Now, quite deliberately, he has altered his focus.

Why? Not, he hastens to stress in the

The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson

by Bernard Bailyn
Harvard \$12.50

preface, because he has become a latter-day Loyalist—although his treatment of Hutchinson is sympathetic in many respects. Rather, Bailyn believes that the time has come when a comprehensive, balanced understanding of the Revolution is finally possible. The eras of "heroic" and "Whig" interpretations, with their inherent limitations of perspective, are past; the "wholeness" of the Revolution can now, at last, be grasped. But if this third and, in Bailyn's view, most profound stage of historical comprehension is upon us, knowledge of only one side—the winners—is not enough. We must strive, says Bailyn, to understand why intelligent and honorable men could ever oppose the Revolution. "I turn," he states, "to the losers sympathetically in order to explain the human reality against which the victors struggled and so to help make the story whole and comprehensible."

The result, as those who have read Bailyn's previous works have come to expect, is a brilliant and provocative book that is a model of historical craftsmanship. *The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson* is a vividly written, poignant story of the defeat, humiliation, and destruction of a capable, decent, and increasingly helpless man who never accurately fathomed the passions and aspirations of the Revolu-

tionary movement. In 1760, Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts was forty-nine years old. Harvard-educated, successful in business and politics, widely respected, this fifth-generation Yankee was—or so it seemed—destined for even greater success. Indeed, in the decade that followed he became Chief Justice and then Governor of the province; every significant political honor that he could hope to acquire was bestowed upon him. But it would all turn to ashes, and in the end his career lay in ruins. More than that: when he yielded the governorship in 1774 to General Thomas Gage, he was almost universally regarded throughout Massachusetts not merely as a failure but as a traitor. In Hutchinson's record as Governor and as defender of the rights of Parliament, patriots of every rank saw not misplaced good will, not even honest error, but willful, deceitful malevolence. Hutchinson, it was alleged, had repeatedly lied to his British superiors about American goals and intentions. He had plotted to "abridge what are called English liberties" in the colonies, all the while concealing his criminal intent. He had wronged his countrymen to gain privileges and favors from Britain and had worked to destroy the ancient harmony within the empire in order to advance the cause of tyranny and his private greed.

It is one of the conclusions of Bailyn's splendidly written biography that most of these charges were completely false. Far from being a "vile serpent" (as John Adams called him), Thomas Hutchinson emerges in Bailyn's book as an honorable, prudent, reflective man who avoided appeals to passion and strove always to be thoughtful and judicious. He did not secretly attempt to sell out his native province. He did not support such hated British measures as the Stamp Act, which, in fact, he had opposed. To the cautious, calculating Hutchinson, however, continued American dependence on Great Britain in the 1760s and 1770s was a necessity. It was self-evident that in a world of ravenous nation-states a close, protective tie with England was essential. This inescapable fact of life inexorably

meant that Parliament had to retain ultimate sovereignty over the colonies; Hutchinson hoped that Parliament's power would rarely have to be invoked, but the internal stability and external security of the colonies required *some* dependence on England and even some restrictions on colonial freedom. So Hutchinson argued again and again—to be greeted with ever-increasing vituperation and disdain. When, in 1773, Benjamin Franklin obtained in England some of Hutchinson's confidential correspondence with British officials and promptly "leaked" it to patriots in Massachusetts, the residual effectiveness of the Loyalist governor was destroyed. Despite the fact that these letters contained nothing that Hutchinson had not said publicly, they were quickly published all over America—and were regarded as convincing proof of Hutchinson's nefarious designs. It was all downhill thereafter: within a year of this sensational episode, he was in exile; within two years his home in Milton was seized and still more of his private letters published in distorted form. Hutchinson died in England in 1780, a reviled and broken man. It is impossible to read Bailyn's biography without feeling compassion for an individual who, whatever his opinions, seems not to have deserved the strident and sometimes vicious attacks that helped to drive him from his native land.

And yet the verdict cannot be so one-sided. However respectful Bailyn's portrait of Hutchinson may be, he clearly indicates that the Loyalist governor was not without faults. Hutchinson was an ambitious, acquisitive individual whose very success understandably stimulated his foes' apprehensions. In the early 1770s, for instance, when Hutchinson was Governor, his brother-in-law, Andrew Oliver, was Lieutenant Governor; another brother-in-law was Chief Justice of the Superior Court; and a nephew was Associate Justice. This remarkable concentration of offices in two families did not violate the canons of the passing age, but it greatly disturbed Hutchinson's enemies, ever fearful of executive encroachments and fortified by libertarian ideology. Therein, says Bailyn, was the source of Hutchinson's "ultimate failure": his inability to comprehend the "moral indignation and the meliorist aspirations" of the "new politics" of the 1760s and 1770s. As a product of a hard-nosed political world of patronage and self-interest, Hutchinson—according to Bailyn—simply could not understand "the passions of the age"; he could not transcend "the received wisdom" and the "accepted morality." From this limitation flowed a fatal consequence: his underestimation of the breadth and power of the forces he sought vainly to control. Hutchinson believed that his principal enemies were demagogic agitators who irresponsibly stirred up the passive masses for selfish ends. According to Bailyn, Hutchinson never perceived the "deep-lying, almost universal, fears of absolutist govern-

ment" which motivated his enemies. He never understood the extent to which his entire political culture—not just his "demagogic" rivals—was already permeated by libertarian thought. To Hutchinson it was only prudent and logical that Parliament retain absolute theoretical control over the colonies. To his foes Hutchinson's very words, his very arguments smacked of tyranny and treason. In short, Hutchinson practiced the "old politics" just at the point that the Age of Walpole was giving way to what R.R. Palmer has called "the Age of Democratic Revolutions." Able and estimable though he was, Hutchinson was a victim of the transition.

In presenting this analysis of Hutchinson's career and character, Bailyn runs

The defeat, humiliation, and destruction of a capable, decent man who never quite fathomed the passions and aspirations of his Revolutionary age.

certain risks. For although he explicitly criticizes Hutchinson's limitations in the book and declares his own pro-Revolution sentiments in the preface, most of the biography evokes sympathy for an unjustly maligned figure. Bailyn portrays the dilemmas and sorrows of Hutchinson so effectively that the "new politics" of the 1760s and 1770s appear in a rather unedifying light. One finds little evidence in this book of "the optimistic and idealist impulses" that Bailyn says motivated the advocates of the Revolution.

But perhaps this is exactly the effect that Bailyn intended his book to have. For it is precisely by means of the author's respect for the Governor that Hutchinson at last receives a decent hearing before the bar of history. Bailyn succeeds in helping the reader to *feel* Hutchinson's plight and to see his world as he saw it. In adopting such an approach Bailyn need not argue with Hutchinson, still less point out the radical alternatives to the Governor's position. Other books—notably *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*—have already done that. Moreover, by presenting the losing side so vigorously and perceptively, Bailyn enables us to measure the vigor of the forces which ultimately vanquished the Loyalists. In this indirect fashion, he emphasizes anew how genuinely radical, in many ways, our Revolution was. Not in the bloody sense of more recent upheavals, although there was plenty of

rioting and intimidation in Massachusetts before 1775. Nor in the economic, class-conscious sense beloved by Marxist and Progressive historians. For while Bailyn recognizes that the Revolution obviously had "social consequences," it was "in its essence" a "political and ideological" event.

But Bailyn's work has a pertinence that transcends its immediate subject. In an intriguing way *The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson* is a book for our era—a book which conservatives especially might ponder. For as Bailyn explains in his preface, he has written a work "which depicts the fortunes of a conservative in a time of radical upheaval." The jacket of *The Ordeal* goes further: Bailyn, it asserts, "gives us a general commentary on a rigidly conservative, rationally self-interested political establishment" that was obsessed by a "fear of conspiracy" and that resorted to "law and order" and "growing duplicity" to subdue its "fierce opposition." Bailyn's book is not, of course, written as a "tract for the times"; he properly states that his subject is the eighteenth century, not the twentieth. Yet so relevant are the dilemmas with which Governor Hutchinson struggled that we are almost inevitably reminded of modern politics on nearly every page.

And it is wise, I think, that we are. For the questions posed by Hutchinson's career have a somber urgency that seems likely to intensify. Are the flaws which Bailyn attributes to Hutchinson—a "calculatingly pragmatic approach to politics," "insensitivity to the moral ingredients of public life," and unresponsiveness to new and strange aspirations—the typical weaknesses of conservatives in power? Is the underestimation of radical ideologies a characteristically conservative vice, or is it more commonly a rationalistic, liberal one? How does a counter-revolutionary leader successfully cope with a mass movement whose tendency—whether admitted or not—is revolutionary? What is the best way—is there a "best way"—to contain destructive "passions that grip men's minds"? How can government and its supporters work to defuse an ideology that sees malevolence in the most prudent of measures? If a government waits passively until a radical challenge has become a "clear and present danger" to its very survival, has it not already waited too long?

These are questions not just for Hutchinson's time but for ours as well. As a friend said to me recently, one of the key questions of contemporary politics has yet to be decided: will a conservative leader be able—will he be allowed—to govern America effectively? Or will he be destroyed by self-righteous spokesmen for our era's "new politics," "new morality," and "beliefs and passions that grip people's minds"? Suddenly the experience of a beleaguered Loyalist governor of Massachusetts seems relevant indeed. It is the conservative fate in the 1970s to live in a time of radical upheaval, and the ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson may some day be our own. □

Toward a War of All against All

Is still another book on Watergate, the 1972 election, and all the concomitant disasters that have befallen the Republican Party and conservatives really necessary? Surely even the most vindictive, gloating liberal has had his appetite for such books satiated by now.

Jaws of Victory, however, I am happy to report, is not just another Watergate book, but perhaps the most important analysis yet published on politics in the Nixon era. Where other books merely chronicle events and speculate somewhat lamely on the motives of the Nixon managers, the authors of this book have a more serious, theoretical purpose. Their theme is that much of the disturbing, aberrant behavior associated with the entire Watergate phenomenon is the direct result of the growing popularity of game-plan politics.

The authors' crucial argument is that "the 1972 election marked an undesirable turning point in the direction of an excessive use of strategic thinking and war-gaming techniques in American politics, and that the electorate was understandably reacting very negatively to this phenomenon." This was the result of a fundamental change in the way many politicians think about politics. Increasingly, political leaders are moving from the traditional constitutional representative ideal of politics to the strategic ideal. In other words, the modern disciples of Clausewitz and Hobbes have ascended the ranks of political parties to become campaign managers, media experts, and public relations men. Consequently, the conflict between parties and candidates is increasingly taking on all the attributes of

total war instead of a mere political contest for public office.

The hyperstrategists are accused of using "all the logic of military strategy: deterrence, contingency planning, escalation, diversionary tactics, counterintelligence, and sabotage." Like modern Clausewitzians they believe that

Jaws of Victory: The Game-Plan Politics of 1972, the Crisis of the Republican Party, and the Future of the Constitution

by the Ripon Society and
Clifford W. Brown, Jr.
Little, Brown \$10.95

"politics...was the continuation of warfare by other means." Their "game mentality...led them to believe that the essence of politics was outpointing antagonists and adversaries." Their fascination with strategy and tactics led them to "feel that government was chiefly a matter of playing and winning games."


The consequences of this view, in the eyes of Prof. Brown and his coauthors, have been unhealthy for both the party system and the state of the Union. First, the strategic view is destroying the two-party system by creating a condition of nonalignment among voters. Old loyalties based upon traditional categories of trust and obligation within parties are being replaced by mere strategic alignments between groups and individ-

uals which tend to be characteristically transitory. The strategy of the campaign is to create a condition of party nonalignment among voters by concentrating on the swing voter and neglecting the party loyalists. "'Ignore anybody who has no place else to go' is a good strategic maxim." Thus conservatives were shunned by the Nixon managers. Second, political morality withers as the traditional adherence to the rules of politics based upon prudence, custom, and the reverence for limited constitutional government is ignored. The strategic view of politics ignores precisely this traditional adherence; for in the narrow Hobbesian world where politics is looked upon as the "war of every man against every man," the objectives of politics are defined only in terms of success and are not limited by moral principle, respect for people and institutions, fairness and duty, commitment to service, or concrete principle. The goals of strategy are simply to succeed, win, and prosper.

The inherent paradox of the excessive strategic approach is that its frenetic, almost paranoid preoccupation with security is ultimately self-destructive. "For four solid years [the Nixon Administration] had been pursuing a consistent policy of undercutting its own intrinsic power position as a result of its hyperstrategic perception of reality. It was a dramatic example of men bent on rational suicide." The more Nixon's managers strove to increase his power through their strategies, the more they undermined respect for the Presidency and the legitimacy of Nixon's leadership. "Each of their strategies seemed quite logical, but

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as each began to increase the *power* of the President it simultaneously undercut his *authority*."

Although the expressed purpose of the authors is to argue for the abandonment of strategic politics and for the return to party politics, they are gloomy about the likelihood of such an eventuality. "The strategic practices of modern politics are here with us to stay," they write. "No matter how much legislation is passed to curb the activities of politicians and no matter how many sermons are preached against them, they will continue to be strategists and manipulators."

What then is to be done? A partial response to this question lies in the capacity of the Republican Party to regenerate itself. To achieve this, the authors boldly argue for the formation of an alliance between the Old Right and moderate Republicans. As a result of the confusions of Watergate, the opportunity now presents itself, in the authors' view, for the moderate Republicans and the traditionalists of the Old Right to explore the possibility of an alliance to check the excesses and dangerous policies of the New Right. Unlike the Old Right of the Eisenhower-Taft tradition, the New Right

has as its unifying principle not freedom, but security—"personal, proprietary, economic, political, and national security." Corporatist economic philosophy, new wealth, and a penchant for the heady politics of war-gaming are its characteristic attributes.

"The Old Right will soon perceive that nothing will hurt this country more than embracing the doctrine of the New Right." Therefore, it appears quite logical that it would opt for an alliance with Ripon Society Republicans to oppose the New Right. The basis of this realignment would be a commitment to rather broad and disturbingly vague policies of free-market economics, human rights, a nonadventurist foreign policy, and the mutual abhorrence of strategic policies. Around these principles Republicans would be expected to unite and build a solid base of support.

The authors' proposal for a new ideological realignment within the Republican Party is not the strongest section in this book and seems a little too self-serving coming from the liberal Ripon Society. However, this chapter at least begins the discussion on the curious predicament in which the Republican

Party now finds itself. According to the Gallup Poll 59 percent of Americans identify themselves as "conservative," yet liberal candidates appear disproportionately successful in elections. The inability of the Republican Party to build a solid enduring constituency on this conservative base indicates a profound failure in its leadership.

If the Republican Party is to survive and not be relegated to the "dustbin of history," as some have predicted, then it must appeal to a broad constituency. Perhaps, as William Rusher has suggested, a new political party of traditional conservatives and blue-collar workers is needed; or perhaps, as Jeffrey Hart has argued, Republicans need only concern themselves with domestic policies more than they have in the past. In any case, the failures of the Republican Party must not be perceived as a mere failure in public relations which could be solved by a national advertising firm marketing Republicanism or selling the Grand Old Party to the nation. Such an approach, if we are to believe the convincing arguments of the authors of this book, would not end the crisis of the Republican Party but would perpetuate it. □

Book Review/Karl O'Lessker

Wattenberg's America

What is it about the middle class that arouses otherwise mild-tempered leftist intellectuals to such furious disdain, to such prodigies of denunciation? Granted most members of the middle class are neither leftist nor intellectual; they decorate their homes in execrable taste and spend far too much time watching television; their views on foreign policy tend to be fairly primitive when not downright jingoistic; and they seem lamentably unwilling to offer up their own children on the altar of racial balance in the schools, or drastically to change their eating habits in order to feed the starving millions of the world. All this is true, some of it no doubt is morally discreditable, and it certainly helps define the difference between a suburbanite sales representative and Noam Chomsky. But why should one be *quite* so savage toward the sales representative and his way of life?

The question is even more puzzling when the sales representative happens to be black—which he is just now beginning to be in numbers large enough to be statistically significant—and when the denouncer is not a white university professor, so adept at calling on others to sacrifice, but a black nationalist out of the streets of Chicago or Oakland, who well knows that the alternative to middle-classness for black people

is poverty and terror in the slums.

Let me try to put the problem into perspective. In what may be the most striking and valuable of the mass of statistics Ben Wattenberg lays out in his new book, *The Real America*, we learn that while practically all Americans made great material progress during the

*The Real America:
A Surprising Examination
of the State of the Union*

by Ben J. Wattenberg
Doubleday \$10

decade of the sixties, the rate of progress for blacks was in most categories sharply higher than for whites. As examples: black family income just about doubled during the decade while that of whites went up by 69 percent; white-collar and skilled-craftsman employment among blacks rose by 79 percent, as against a 26 percent increase among whites; the number of black college students soared by 97 percent, compared to a 26 percent increase for whites; the proportion of black families with annual income in excess of \$10,000 increased from 13 to 32 percent; the proportion of black families in poverty (by federal definition) declined

from 48 to 29 percent; black home ownership increased; black infant mortality declined; and so on and on, adding up to a nearly unblemished record of material progress.

And not only material. Just as Wattenberg's hard economic data show real advances for black people, so the soft attitudinal data show a massive turning away from racial bigotry on the part of whites. One striking example: in 1959, according to Gallup Poll data, white Southerners objected by a proportion of 72 to 25 percent to "sending your children to a school where a few children are colored." Ten years later the proportion was more than reversed: only 21 percent objected as against 78 percent who did not. (The case can be made, and has been made *ad nauseam*, that present-day opposition to school busing is simply white racism in new garb. The response to that is that if you cannot comprehend the difference between total opposition to integration of any kind and opposition to a program that buses one's kids into violence-ridden, drug-infested, academically disastrous schools, you either don't have kids or do have trouble thinking. Put another way, unwillingness to volunteer one's own children as shock-troops in the battle for equalized education may be morally deplorable, but it is a very long way from being, in one of Wattenberg's

rare good phrases, "ethnic, beer-swilling, pot-bellied, raw, stonewall racism.")

For black people, then, America in the mid-seventies is beginning to look like that land of promise they had heard about for so long. But no sooner does it appear that whites will stop resisting and resenting their progress than they hear themselves excoriated by other blacks— young, articulate, media-conscious blacks, who condemn their movement into the suburban middle class as being somehow a cop-out, a violation of the essential spirit of *négritude*, a headlong lemming-like rush into the same materialist wasteland in which white Americans have long since mindlessly imprisoned themselves.... *Very* puzzling. Especially in that what this view condemns as the quintessential character of the American middle class comes as close to being a universal aspiration of struggling peoples everywhere as one can likely find. Try offering the Hong Kong coolie, the black South African miner, the Sicilian peasant a chance to live among his own kind in a neat suburban community, a car in the garage, a color TV in the family room, and plenty to eat, all in exchange for forty hours a week in an office or on the assembly line, and see whether he reacts like Eldridge Cleaver or like Archie Bunker.

Irrelevant and immaterial. The masses are so easily misled by materialistic lures. Or so the critics of middle-classness would say. But these critics never define just what glorious state of being it is that the masses are so easily misled from. The air is full of words like "authentic" and "life-enhancing" and "human dignity" and all, but I have never seen a description by any of these critics of a set of material conditions appropriate to supporting life for some four billion souls. New Mexico communes? Eighteenth-century Virginia freeholds? Hardly. Blocks of Moscow apartment houses as far as the eye can see? Okay, but in what sense is that superior to suburbia? (I don't for a moment suggest that the world's entire population will one day be able to live in Happy Acres. The point is that it at least comes closer to being a plausible goal than anything the critics of the middle class are able to devise. And I should add, the fact that the nomads of Kurdistan wouldn't give you a plugged kopek for an eight-room house in Happy Acres doesn't dull the point. The great majority of the earth's population would.)

Back then to the situation for black Americans. The overwhelming majority of blacks share not only middle-class aspirations but middle-class values. They want those material comforts and they think it entirely appropriate to work for them. They are opposed to handouts. They want their kids to study and do well in school. They're quite willing to deal with gray-flannel *angst*, thank you very much, so long as they have a chance to enjoy first its material accoutrements.

Is that bad, unworthy? I return to the central point of this thesis. Middle-class

values are not only widely shared throughout at least the industrialized world, they are eminently defensible. For that vast majority of mankind who are incapable of sainthood, a life lived according to middle-class precepts can be a generous, humane, and satisfying one. To the extent that middle-class values spread, human savagery diminishes and, in Camus' piercing phrase, fewer children are tortured. What, one wonders, do the haters of the middle class want people in mass society to be or to do? How would black radical leaders have ordinary black people comport themselves? As revolutionist shock-troops, no doubt. But then? After the revolution? To what then should the black (or white) workingman aspire? To a decent job, a comfortable home, education for his children, some at least of the material amenities...in short, to precisely those goals which the middle class today espouses and which earn for it the contemptuous opprobrium of the elite.

For that vast majority of mankind incapable of sainthood, a life lived according to middle-class precepts can be a generous, humane, and satisfying one.

At the heart of Wattenberg's reflections on the American condition is an inchoate Idea of Progress. The present state of things, he finds again and again, is "better by far than what it replaces." And in many instances few if any of us would disagree with him. Who, after all, could be displeased by a decline in the high school dropout rate from 55 percent in 1940 to 25 percent in 1972? But it is nowhere clear that Wattenberg has ever troubled to clarify his own thinking—or ever recognized the need for clarification—about the consequences of social change ("progress," if you will). He thinks it "very much a plus," for example, that so many people have quit farming and moved "to a whole new life in an urban or suburban area." The reason he thinks so is that poverty in America is disproportionately located in rural areas ("Ruralia," in a typically inelegant Wattenberg neologism—and, yes, those who live there are "Ruralians.") So poverty is diminished somehow when white hillbillies emigrate from Appalachia to Cincinnati and black sharecroppers leave Mississippi for Manhattan. Convinced? No, I'm not either, but Wattenberg has a weakness for truth by assertion.

Equally curious is his position on the increase in the number of working wives. By his own showing it is not only male

chauvinist pigs who question whether "progress" is exemplified by women fleeing home in droves to take up employment as "secretaries, computer programmers, key-punch operators, and social workers," relying then on McDonald's and Colonel Sanders to do the cooking for their families. Here Wattenberg displays some of his fanciest footwork. After first heaping contempt on "Women's Lib ideologues" for wanting women to become economically independent, he sanctimoniously reports that "American women—many, many of them—feel that wives at work are not the best of all possible circumstances and can, in fact, cause detrimental side effects, side effects that are particularly harmful to family life." But then he immediately goes on to declare the "strong trend toward working women...a plus. It is better than what it replaces."

Is this judgment (which of course puts him squarely on the side of the Women's Lib ideologues) based on analysis, or even consideration, of those possibly harmful consequences to family life? Not a bit of it. In fact he ignores the question. Instead, after some irrelevance about options for jobs as opposed to jobs per se he concludes: "The increasing number of women who make the choice to work now feel...that it's worth it. If it's good enough for them, it's good enough for us. It's good."

Q.E.D.? Not, I think, quite. Pray let me emphasize that I am not myself arguing one way or another; still less am I suggesting that all women ought humbly and dutifully to eschew professional aspirations and economic independence. I point out only that, here as too frequently elsewhere in the book, Wattenberg's declaration that a present state of things is better than what it replaces may rest on a less solid evidentiary and analytical base than he imagines.

Politics Ain't Beanbag

Taken all in all *The Real America* can be read as a celebration of the American middle class, its condition and values. I have no doubt that this is worth doing, especially at a time when the mood of the reigning intelligentsia is sourly if not bitterly antibourgeois. But if like Wattenberg you approach the data in so determinedly upbeat a frame of mind as to be able to discern no trace of wrongdoing or wrongthinking on the part of the statistical majority of Americans, some of your readers may be forgiven for regarding you as neither a reporter nor an analyst but a salesman. And the question arises, what are you selling?

In Wattenberg's case the answer is, Senator Henry M. ("Scoop") Jackson. As most of you know, Wattenberg is a member of the innermost circle of Jackson presidential campaign strategists. And for my part I find it impossible to believe that he would have spent so much time and energy so close to the campaign writing a book that bore no effective relationship to his leader's aspirations. Quite the

contrary: a man in Wattenberg's position vis-à-vis a leading presidential candidate simply could not permit himself the luxury of writing on sensitive political matters unless it were clearly perceived as advancing the candidate's cause. That means that the data have to be interpreted always and only in conformity with the candidate's positions. And never, never, never must the author call into question or even look askance at Middle America's values or attitudes (at least as measured by the polls). For in the accurate and oft-repeated words of Mr. Dooley, "Politics ain't beanbag"—presidential politics least of all.

This is the explanation, I believe, for what several reviewers found most puzzling in the book—its relentlessly Panglossian tone. For all his defects as a stylist, far too many to cite here, Wattenberg isn't stupid; still less is he politically naive. So he *must* know that the statistical majorities on whom he lavishes such moist-eyed, tremulous admiration haven't been and aren't always right. But of such gentle skepticism no whisper is heard in this utilitarian celebration of consumer sovereignty triumphant.

Can Wattenberg deep down be so uncritically accepting of whatever happens to be the mass opinion of the moment? Or is it instead, as I have suggested, that he is a high-level technician

in the service of a centrist, labor-oriented presidential candidate? Now if all this has too much of an ad hominem ring to those of you trained in logic, I can only plead guilty and then go on to report my conviction that a political tract, such as the work under review clearly is, requires not only analysis of the truth-function of its propositions but inquiry into its author's motives. This is because, unlike the closed universe of the syllogism (no matter how extensive and complex that syllogism may be), the political tract is an exercise in selectivity. So that even though every single proposition in it may be empirically true and logically consistent, the propositions taken all in all may have been so selected as to cumulate to a greatly distorted picture of reality. Moreover in most tracts the author serves up not only propositions but evaluations—Wattenberg does so in abundance—and it helps to know the value position from which he proceeds. Thus it seems to me not only permissible but necessary to bring ad hominem considerations into account when dealing with political writings, be they of a Wattenberg or a Tyrrell or a Julian Bond. (It remains eternally true, of course, that a *fact* is not disproved by reference to the reporter's political biases or sexual habits or taste in soft drinks. But any of these may help to explain why he selected that

fact and ignored those four thousand others.)

There are, then, two principal theses in *The Real America*, one proclaimed in the brassiest of tones, the other suggested just above a whisper. The first is that we have as a nation made great material and social progress over the past decade and those who say otherwise are monstrously, sickeningly wrong (the adverbs I have chosen with some care to convey the emotional coloration of Wattenberg's pitch). The second is that the best hope for continued progress is a Democratic Party purged of its McGovernite poisons and committed to the lib-lab policies of the Kennedy-Johnson years. No doubt one can agree with the first while rejecting the second; though Wattenberg himself evidently believes that the causal chain is too strong for that: progress was made precisely *because* of those policies, and is unlikely to be made in their absence. But that belief, no matter how wrongheaded, need not and should not deter you from looking at this fascinating statistical portrait of Middle America. The colors are (to put it mildly) garish, the draftsmanship often leaves much to be desired, but who knows? That may be you peeping out of the corner of the canvas with an entirely unself-conscious, hundred-percent American grin on your Archie Bunker face. □

The Business of America



by
Clyde L.
Dotson

A Monetarist View of the Tax Cut

President Ford's program to remedy unemployment and recession calls for a tax cut of approximately \$16 billion. This move is apparently based on a belief that people spend 90 percent of their disposable income and that there is a strong causal relationship between fiscal policy and GNP. Were this true a tax cut of this size should add \$14.4 billion to GNP and aid greatly in solving our recession problems.

For a number of reasons, however, this assumption may not be true. First, as demonstrated by Milton Friedman in his book *A Theory of the Consumption Function*, the propensity of people to consume is based not on their immediate income but rather on their Permanent Income. According to this theory a temporary tax cut would not affect consumption: the additional disposable income would be saved. Since this tax cut is being sold

partially on the basis that it can be more easily reversed than could a spending program, it would appear to be temporary.

Another, and more important, problem evolves from the fact that Ford's proposed budget is \$36 billion in deficit even without the tax cut, and the cut raises the total deficit to \$52 billion. Since government purchases must be paid for, this deficit must be financed. There are two means of financing open to the Treasury. The first involves selling bonds to the public. Evidence provided by Leonall Anderson and Jerry Jordan in "Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization," in the *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review*, shows that this bond sale "crowds out" an almost equal amount of private spending. On their evidence we would be returning money to

the public through the tax cut and taking it back through "crowding out."

The second means of financing available is through Open Market Operations by the Federal Reserve System. In this activity the Fed purchases the securities which would be sold to the public under the first procedure. When the Fed purchases treasury securities it increases the monetary base which, through the multiplier, increases the supply of money. As has been demonstrated many times, however, increased monetary growth rates cause faster growth of prices. Professor Friedman has shown there is a six-month lag between an increase in monetary growth and an increase in total spending. This means that monetary growth rates in the fourth quarter of 1974 and first quarter of 1975 are the primary causal variables of economic activity in the latter half of 1975.

the reason for the current reduced spending is the relative reduction in monetary growth during the last half of 1974. From December 1973 through June 1974 M-2 (the money supply defined as currency in circulation plus checking accounts and savings deposits) grew at a rate of 8.9 percent. In the last half of 1974 it grew at 6.1 percent and only 4.8 percent in the third quarter. This has definitely created some slack in the economy. However, this slack should be gone soon since M-2 grew at 7.5 percent in the final quarter of 1974 and the Fed is even now pumping more money into the economy. Because of this, one of the questions concerning the tax cut is whether it is necessary. The cut is intended to pull us out of a recession. The available evidence would seem to show that the Federal Reserve's current action in increasing the growth rate of money will accomplish this alone. There are only two possible results of the tax cut. It will either "crowd out" private spending and thereby defeat its stated objectives, or,

more likely, it will increase monetary growth rates and thereby inflation.

It is possible that our government's urge to take this action derives from a misunderstanding of the relationships in our economy. This is most visible in the field of employment policy. For the last twenty years the policies of the federal government have been based on the "Phillips Curve." According to this relationship unemployment may be reduced by increasing inflation. There have been several studies lately questioning this relationship. One of the best of these is Samuel Morley's chapter, "The Phillips Curve," in his book *The Economics of Inflation*. Morley demonstrates that the curve is only a short-run phenomenon. There exists a normal unemployment rate which is the result of the structure of the labor market. Government action which causes the existing rate to go below this in the short run also causes reactions within the market which cause rates above the norm during the recovery phase of the inflationary cycle. It is this

that causes our unemployment problem today. When labor discovers that its real wage is being reduced because of inflation, it requires, in order to stay even, larger and larger nominal wage increases as inflation gets worse. Monetary and fiscal policies can have no lasting effects on unemployment. If government truly wishes to reduce long-run unemployment it must investigate the inefficiencies in our current labor market structure. Examples of these inefficiencies are current minimum wage laws, difficulties in learning about job opportunities, and organized labor's control over supply in various industries.

Without reductions in government spending a tax cut at this time will either accomplish nothing or, more likely, refuel the fires of inflation. Government should use its monetary and fiscal policies to aid in controlling inflation. In the area of unemployment it should investigate the above-mentioned restrictions in the labor market. □

Book Review/George Carey

The Dance of Modern Men

Beyond any doubt Professor Wilson's *Political Organizations* will assume a very high place among the already vast and excellent body of literature in the political science field which deals with organizations and interest group behavior. More than this, it should serve to focus our attention once again on the importance of formal and informal group behavior in the larger context of the American political system. And this, to say the least, will be an accomplishment, for, as Professor Wilson correctly notes, over the past decade or so political scientists have increasingly turned their attention away from "group politics" to such matters as public policy content and impact, survey data findings, and the like.

Wilson's approach to his subject matter, the behavior of *voluntary* organizations, is both refreshing and novel: refreshing because he avoids the turgid theoretical mumbo jumbo characteristic of many, if not most, similar undertakings; novel because he eschews the widely used "rational model" and "natural systems" approaches which contain within themselves certain unrealistic assumptions concerning the goals and purposes of organizational behavior. As Wilson puts this matter: "The rational model assumes that all organizations have goals beyond member satisfaction, but this may not be the case (try, for example, to state intelligibly the goals of a university); it also assumes that organizational behavior is motivated by a desire to attain its goals, but it is obvious that

motives may be quite disparate and unrelated to stated objectives. The natural-system model is subject to all the criticisms leveled at functionalist approaches to social understanding generally—'system maintenance' is at best a tautology, at worst a conservative bias. Saying that organizations seek to survive is not very different from saying that organizations exist, a statement that is of

Political Organizations

by James Q. Wilson
Basic Books \$10.95

no interest at all and entails the risk of leading one to assume that survival, maintenance, and equilibrium are desirable social states."

The theoretical perspective offered by Wilson "is that the behavior of persons occupying organization roles (leader, spokesman, executive, representative) is principally, though not uniquely, determined by the requirements of organizational maintenance and enhancement and that this maintenance, in turn, chiefly involves supplying tangible and intangible incentives to individuals in order that they will become, or remain, members and will perform certain tasks." Though he believes this perspective can be profitably applied to groups other than voluntary, he does focus on voluntary organizations because it is with

respect to such noncoercive organizations "that the effects of incentive systems are most clearly visible."

The thesis which permeates *Political Organizations* is that the behavior of group leaders is best understood in light of "their efforts to maintain and enhance the organization and their position in it." Such an understanding clearly involves a knowledge of the "constraints and requirements imposed by their [the leaders'] organizational roles." But to understand their organizational roles, in turn, requires a full understanding of such factors as why people join organizations (incentives), the modes by which leaders are selected or elected, the very processes by which organizations were formed in the first place, and the strategies they employ in dealing with other groups and government. To put this otherwise, a broad knowledge of organizations in the sense indicated above enables us to comprehend the strategies and tactics of group leadership bent upon maintaining and enhancing both their own position within the organization and that of the organization vis à vis other organizations.

Common sense assumptions and observations prevail in the development of Wilson's theoretical perspectives (Section I). He assumes that individuals will "join organizations for a variety of reasons and that they are more or less rational about action taken on behalf of these reasons. Thus, they will not for long remain in an organization that offers

them the very opposite of what they want...." He also assumes that "executives seek chiefly to minimize organizational strain" and that the social and political structure of the general society (fragmentary or unified) will affect the external and internal ordering and behavior of organizations. Certainly one of the more important chapters in this section in light of his analysis in subsequent sections is chapter three, "Organizational Maintenance and Incentives," wherein the kinds and nature of incentives are discussed. Three major types of incentives, each containing within them variations, are identified: material, solidary, and purposive. Material incentives characterize those associations such as business and labor that either allocate "tangible benefits that are directly under [their] control or [regulate] access to these benefits." Solidary incentives are generally nontangible and involve status, prestige, camaraderie, and friendship; they are associated with a wide variety of organizations such as country clubs, lodges, charitable groups, etc. "Thus, solidary rewards as a whole differ from material ones in that their effect, and indeed their existence, depends on the maintenance of valued social relationships (money benefits, but not social ones, may be received and enjoyed anonymously and even in isolation and where public they are as valuable when received from an enemy or a faceless benefactor as when received from an acquaintance)." The characteristic of purposive organizations is that their members work for the presumed benefit of the public or societal whole. Benefits accruing to their members take the form of personal satisfaction for having accomplished or having worked for the common good. "Three kinds of purposes, and thus three kinds of organizations relying on purpose as an incentive, can be distinguished: goal-oriented, ideological, and redemptive."

In Part II, "The Perspective Applied," Wilson deals with four major associational groups: political parties, labor unions, business associations, and civil rights organizations. Citing a vast array of empirical evidence and utilizing his theoretical construct, he is able to show how various organizations within each of these groups possess what can be termed a "personality" of their own which impose varied and unique demands upon organization leaders. Only a few examples will be cited here in the context of incentives to illustrate Wilson's thesis.

The formation of the American Federation of Labor was facilitated by the fact that its incentives were primarily solidary; that is, its roots grew from independent but closely knit groups with common trades and often of the same nationality. Therefore, the concerns of AFL leadership until fairly recent times have been relatively narrow and local in nature. The Congress of Industrial Organizations' appeal, in contrast, was directed toward a nationally dispersed potential membership of lower economic and social status. Hence, in its incipient

stages, the CIO had to rely upon purposive incentives to attract membership. And even today with the merger of these two labor wings there are still detectable differences between the behavior and orientation of the staffs and leadership of both.

Political parties, already fragmented because of our diffuse political structure, present the full panorama of leadership difficulties in the context of varying incentives. Some political units are based primarily on solidary benefits, others on purposive incentives, and still others (machines) on material incentives. Indeed, most political organizations are based in varying degrees on all three. Each presents baffling problems and calls for an array of leadership technique and skills. It would be a mistake, for instance, to believe that solidary incentives yield greater unity and loyalty than purposive incentives. Neither is free from difficulties, although solidary organizations may even require more consummate leadership skills, particularly when there are significant ethnic, religious, and educa-



tional differences between the units comprising it. In this connection, the trend, as Wilson sees it, is a decline in material incentives and an increased reliance on the solidary and purposive.

Likewise, to understand civil rights organizations, their policy positions as well as their successes and failures, one must know and appreciate their history, structure, and incentives. The so-called "conservative" stance of the NAACP is due in large measure to its original goals and subsequent organizational development. As Wilson notes, "the NAACP from the first developed a structure and program that required little of the average member, permitted a variety of incentives to be employed at the branch level, limited its purposes to fairly specific goals that were generally approved by blacks, and engaged in campaigns that made it possible for victories to be won in the short term." The more "liberal" CORE and SNCC, on the other hand, "were redemptive associations relying on broadly stated purposes the achievement of which required not only a general transformation of society but also the exemplary conduct of members."

The remainder of this book, divided into three major sections ("Internal Processes," "External Processes," and "Political Roles"), would be impossible to synthesize here save to note that the elements of the theoretical perspective—incentives, social and political structure, rationality, and self-interest—are all employed for understanding both the

internal and external behavior of group leaders. Here we must pick and choose and note in a general way only some of the interesting areas surveyed.

(a) Cleavages between the professional staffs and members of an organization are not uncommon. Extrapolating from the materials presented, one of the chief and more obvious reasons for this is a difference between the membership and staff incentives. For example, the researches of Lawrence N. Bailis which focused in part on the organization of the welfare mothers in Massachusetts showed that the state-paid organizers were far from content to provide simply the material incentives which were, understandably enough, uppermost in the minds of the members. Indeed not. The staffers "were more interested in building a political movement among the poor that would play a leading role in the reconstruction of society and government." (I should also add that Dr. Michael Balzano, now director of ACTION, found essentially the same situation in VISTA while researching his Ph.D. dissertation.)

But such cleavages are not confined only to social welfare organizations. As Wilson notes, "Professional staff members of labor unions frequently wish to see their organizations act more aggressively on larger social issues than does the elective leadership, but the staff members are only occasionally in a position to carry out their desires."

One reason for friction between staff and members, as Wilson points out, certainly has to do with the relative educational, social, and economic status of staff personnel. "In the Massachusetts Welfare Rights Organization, for example, the paid staff consisted for the most part of young, college-educated whites with a middle- or upper-middle-class background, whereas the membership consisted of women, mostly black, on welfare." However, there can be no doubt that many of those who serve in such staff capacities find their chief incentive to be ideologically purposive and of a distinctively left-wing character.

(b) In an insightful chapter entitled "Organizational Democracy," Wilson suggests the following proposition: "In general, larger organizations seem less democratic than smaller ones, older ones less democratic than younger ones, and those created from the top down less democratic than those built from the bottom up. The evidence is not conclusive, however, and there are important qualifications to each of these generalizations."

One of the principal exceptions to the rule involves the factors of "structure and environment." A large voluntary association, for instance, may seem highly democratic, if one looks only to its local units. However, its national leadership may, because of the highly decentralized structure, have a freer hand in ignoring local "wills," the more so as the resources of the organization are channeled to the top.

Incentives obviously play a role in

determining the internal ordering of an organization. "The kind as well as the value of the incentive employed will affect the demand for democratic forms. Organizations that distribute primarily money benefits are less likely to be democratic than ones that distribute other kinds.... As long as a leader delivers money benefits that substantially exceed the costs of membership, he is not likely to be challenged." Purposive organizations, on the other hand, are generally prone to a more democratic structure, particularly as there is a need to define their purposes and formulate tactics for goal achievement. Solidary incentives by their very nature provide a strong impetus for democratic participation.

(c) Contrary to popular belief, competition between voluntary associations is not common. "Associations, seeking to maintain themselves, are highly averse to risk and thus to active rivalry except under special circumstances. The easiest and most prudent maintenance strategy is to develop *autonomy*—that is, a distinctive area of competence, a clearly demarcated and exclusively served clientele or membership, and undisputed jurisdiction over a function, service, goal, or cause. Just as executives seek to minimize strain in managing the internal affairs of the association, so also they seek to minimize it in their relations with other organizations. Autonomy gives to an association a stable claim to certain resources and thereby reduces uncertainty and lessens threats to survival."

Coalitions, in the sense of "enduring" unions for the advancement of common goals, interests, etc., are also rare. Such coalitions may come about to ward off a perceived threat to existence, to cease costly competition, or to gain a highly significant benefit. More likely, however, temporary or ad hoc alliance is the rule.

And (d), contrary to the impression one might gain from reading certain Washington columnists, group pressure in the governmental process is highly exaggerated. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule which Wilson duly notes. And while it is true that certain groups are known to take an ideological stance on a wide variety of issues (e.g., National Association of Manufacturers, AFL-CIO), the requirements of organization mean that they must be selective in mobilizing their resources. This means that "Whatever the timing or nature of the intervention, the experienced organizational representative will see his task as one of evoking, maintaining, and enhancing existing relationships with sympathetic or like-minded public officials. He, like the precinct captain of a political party, will devote most of his 'contact' time to stimulating activity by, and providing information to, persons who he has reason to believe are in general agreement with him. Time, energy, and money are in short supply; diverting much of any of these resources to persons known, or suspect, to be opposed to you is less efficient than devoting them to persons who, once aroused and informed, will act on

your behalf." Moreover, organizations are likely to "mobilize" only with respect to policy programs which call for "distributed benefits and concentrated costs" or "concentrated benefits and concentrated costs." More exactly, "When a specific, easily identifiable group bears the costs of a program conferring distributed benefits, the group is likely to feel its burdens keenly and thus to have a strong incentive to organize in order that their burdens be reduced or at the very least not increased." So, also, with "[p]rograms that benefit a well-defined group but at a cost to another well-defined group...." Conversely, programs involving "distributed benefits and distributed costs" or "concentrated benefits and distributed costs" will usually not provide incentives for intense organizational activity or conflict.

Now, Professor Wilson has performed his task admirably. He has done what he set out to do and students of the American political system are immeasurably better off for his fine analysis. Yet, the book itself points to broader concerns of



profound significance, concerns which are in themselves beyond the purported scope of the book, but which nevertheless emerge from its pages. We are told that there has been a "rapid expansion of government policy that has produced a kind of immobilism to the extent that each new program has acquired, or even created for itself, a client association that makes it difficult to change, and impossible to abandon, the original measure. The competition of interest groups does not, in the long run, make it difficult for the government to start doing things, it only makes it difficult for the government to stop." This much at least is beyond question.

But the question arises: Whither now? I do not mean this in the sense of whether our more ambitious national programs work, whether they are based on a fiscally sound policy, or even whether they will not eventually undermine the basic fabric of our society. These *are* legitimate concerns all too frequently ignored by the dominant liberal intelligentsia.

Rather, my concern is related to "legitimacy" in the broadest sense of the term. As Wilson points out, "autonomy" is a highly cherished end of an organization but he also writes that "establishing legitimacy is the essence of organization struggle." Legitimacy in the broad sense to which I refer corresponds to Wilson's use of the term in chapter fourteen, though, like Wilson, I find it easier to talk around it rather than define it. We say a

group is legitimate or acquires legitimacy when its demands are not outlandish, when what it seeks is reasonable—or, put otherwise, when its demands are "within reason by the standards of the larger publics...."

Such being the case, a whole host of vital considerations come to the fore. Who or what sets the bounds within which the larger publics determine "reasonableness"? How is this done? I do not mean to set us off on a circle-squaring expedition or point up what many believe to be an inherent weakness in group theory. Quite the contrary. Group theory perhaps more than any other enables us to gain a finer realization that the expansion or contraction of these boundaries is perhaps the most important factor of all in analyzing the political system and its direction. And it is not a long step from this to the further realization that such boundaries simply do not establish themselves, that there are institutions (organizations?) that play a greater role in fixing boundaries than others. For "openers," we have a pretty good idea that the "respectable" mass media and universities (institutions which presumably train the young) are important.

And the further one inquires into this matter of boundary setting, and hence the legitimacy of demands upon government and the private sector, the more one begins to wonder whether the process starts from the "bottom up" (a genuine reflection of public deliberation or response to a genuine or felt need) or from the "top down" (the ideological dictates of those upper-middle-class, well-educated individuals to whom Professor Wilson refers on more than one occasion). If the latter, even with respect to our larger public policy programs, the United States is in for deep trouble. And it simply will not do to place the blame, as so many are wont to do, on "mass politics."

In this connection, while it may be an exaggeration to say that the respectable media can confer instant legitimacy to an organization and its demands, we are not far from the mark in saying that it is highly important in what can be termed an indirect process of legitimacy conferral (e.g., those nice little college kids of a few years back, the best and brightest, who merely wanted to vent their inner frustrations with and demands on the academic structure). But, if instant conferral of legitimacy is beyond the powers of the mass media, instant conferral of illegitimacy is not. And this in the long run may well be the most significant factor in our political processes.

Finally, I should add, this whole problem area is compounded by those well-fed, upper-middle-class, highly-educated cadres who now perceive just how easy it is, given our present processes of fixing the boundaries of legitimacy, to keep jabbing and poking for ever-expanding boundaries. And for this, in large measure, we can thank our "illustrious" law schools and our "distinguished" jurists. □

The Bootblack Stand



by
**George
Washington
Plunkitt**

Dr. George Washington Plunkitt, our prize-winning political analyst, is celebrating the publication of his new book, which is now available at avant-garde bookstores throughout New Jersey. Dr. Plunkitt's book is about the importance of altruism in politics and it is titled What's in It for Me? Although Dr. Plunkitt expects to earn ten million dollars from sales of his new book, he has agreed to continue to advise public figures through this column. Address all correspondence to The Bootblack Stand, c/o The Alternative, P.O. Box 877, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, Continental U.S.A.

Dear Dr. Plunkitt:

I am sad to report that one of my research staffs—I can't recall which—has discovered another example of how business is swindling the average American; this time the culprit is none other than that seemingly sympathetic little man down at the corner florist shop who supports a media campaign that is one of the most powerful ever launched. For years this media campaign has preyed on millions of grieving Americans, urging them to send flowers and get-well bouquets to hospitalized relatives and even to funeral homes. But now, after utilizing some of the most advanced research techniques known to medical science, my staff has discovered that there exists almost no causal connection between flowers and medical recovery, to say nothing of resurrection. In fact, flowers

may even exacerbate some patients' conditions, for instance, hay fever sufferers. We sent questionnaires to one thousand and twelve terminal cancer patients asking them if they noticed any improvement in their condition upon the arrival of costly floral arrangements. Few of the patients had experienced enough improvement even to respond to our questionnaire, and of those who did reply it was obvious that their misery had only been increased. Further, every single patient eventually died—even those receiving more than one floral shipment. In the case of the one thousand and twelve questionnaires we sent to funeral parlors, the response was even more telling—not one reply and no resurrections. It is about time that Congress blew the whistle on this heinous ripoff. What do you suppose our chances are of regulating the florist

industry during this Congress?

—Ralph Nader

Dear Mr. Nader:

Nationalization is the only answer. I suggest that you get on the phone with Henry Reuss immediately.

—GWP

Dear Dr. Plunkitt:

I don't know if you remember me but I am the present Speaker of the House of Representatives, you know, the one they call Howdy Doody, the one who for some embarrassingly long periods the past two years was next in line for the Presidency? Well, I now have my hands full with this Ninety-fourth Congress which is filled with young newly-elected liberal Democrats. Many of them are refusing to sit in the same hall with Republicans, who they believe give scandal and steal stationery. I have told them that all that stuff is just the kind of rhetoric we Democrats use to get elected, but they insist that sitting next to Republicans will be bad for their political careers and will get them into trouble with their in-laws. What can I do?

Cordially,

Carl Albert,

Speaker of the House

Dear Mr. Albert:

I think you have overreacted. Once the new Congressmen relax and see how easy it is to spend other people's money, I believe they will sit down with anyone. That is the beauty of what we now call interest-group politics; everyone shares the common interest of spending other people's money, and everyone gets along fine.

—GWP

Book Review/Robert G. Perrin

Melancholy Frenchman

The Sociology of Emile Durkheim is a remarkable achievement. Written by one of today's pre-eminent social scientists, this volume captures, in just under 300 pages, the seminal contributions of one of the most original, influential, and perennially contemporary sociologists in the history of the discipline. This book is recommended to all who wish—at one and the same time—an introduction to Emile Durkheim and to some of sociology's best thinking about such phenomena as crime, authority, religion, morality, power, and personality.

After an introduction dealing with Durkheim's biography, milieu, and intellectual antecedents, Professor Nisbet turns, in the first chapter, to Durkheim's celebrated idea that sociology is entirely independent of psychology, having its

own subject matter in "social facts." Social facts are "things" having an objective reality in their own right, e.g., laws, religious beliefs, traditions, morals, and values; their provenience is not to be

The Sociology of Emile Durkheim

by Robert A. Nisbet
Oxford \$9.95

seen or explained in terms of innate psychological categories, but in the "system of association," the structure, of the social group itself; their function is to be seen not in terms of individual utility per se, but, more basically, in terms of social utility, e.g., societal integration and adaptation; and they possess enormous powers of "constraint"—there are pen-

alties or resistance to their violation.

Durkheim's signal contribution lay, as Nisbet tells us, in his "unremitting effort to utilize the idea of patterned social behavior, of structure, in the explanation of human ideas and acts." The second and subsequent chapters detail the application of this insight. Not only is religion, for example, an emergent of group life and structure, something strictly social (not psychological) in origin and functional in consequence, but so is crime. Far from being abnormal, a certain amount of criminal behavior is both "normal" and functional for group solidarity. The continued integrity of structural arrangements and associated sentiments and values requires a periodic re-affirmation of their legitimacy. An important mechanism for this is found in

punishment, that which is applied to a crime, viz. the social reaction to an act which "offends very strong collective sentiments." In principle, for crime to disappear, "the sentiments they offend would have to be found without exception in all individual consciousnesses." But, even assuming this, Durkheim continues, "crime would not thereby disappear; it would only change its form." As Professor Nisbet explains, so long as a "gross offense" exists, perception is "dulled to the multitude of small offenses"; but remove the gross by a powerful social control, and the small will then stand out and draw punishment once reserved for only major offenses. "A society," Durkheim affirms, "exempt from [crime] is utterly impossible." The conventional wisdom which denies the utility of retributive punishment can take considerable instruction from Durkheim: to eliminate punishment is eventually to undermine the stability of social values and norms. Society does not punish because there are criminals; there are criminals because society needs to punish. "Criminals"—or would-be objects of punishment—are found even for those who vociferously decry traditional attitudes toward punishment. Where, for example, would the

New Left be without corporations to impugn?

To a large extent, suicide is also a product of group life and structure. Durkheim found that the incidence of suicide is small among the religious, especially those belonging to traditional and corporate religions where much discipline is exercised over individual lives, among the rural-agricultural, and among those in tightly-knit kinship systems. By contrast, suicide is more frequent among both the nonreligious and those belonging to individualistic and rationalistic religions, and among urban-industrial groups. But, as Nisbet explains, "The reason for this variability is not to be found in any distinctive or unique attribute possessed by religious, kinship, or local society, but, rather, in an attribute that is common to them all. And this is the degree of integration of the individual to the group."

In a final and provocative chapter, Nisbet deals with the affinity between central elements of Durkheim's thinking and a few contemporary cultural themes. "It would be impossible," Nisbet insists, "to find a sociologist at the turn of the century in whose writings the themes of alienation, estrangement, and moral iso-

lation are as vividly set forth as in the writings of Durkheim." Durkheim's melancholy and pessimism about the future stood in considerable contrast to the progressivism that saturated his age. Modern development has destroyed rapidly or effaced slowly the older and familiar forms of social organization; class, kindred, parish have been disarrayed under the unrelenting forces of modern individualism and political centralization. But they have not been replaced. With social bonds fragmented, individuals are, Professor Nisbet explains, "precariously exposed to the void on the one hand and the absolute power of the state on the other." "It was," Nisbet relates, "precisely his recognition of the atomizing effects of political power upon the social order that led to Durkheim's recommendation...of new, quasi-occupational groups which would lie intermediate to individual and state, supplying the individual with a form of community relevant to modern economic life and setting up buffers, as it were, to the intrusive role of the modern political state in the lives of individuals." Durkheim's relevance, the present volume makes unmistakably clear, has increased, not decreased, with the passing of time. □

BICKEL (continued from page 4)

richness of the memory. But I must because one of the man's great talents was his gift for friendship, and others have had the experience with him that I had. It is rare to have a friend with whom one shares every level of experience, from drinking and joking, to intensely personal concerns, to discussions of law and legal theory, and speculations about the order of things. It is true that, as the activity ascended in the intellectual scale, my share tended to shrink, mostly because of Alex's talents but also, it must be stated candidly, because of his flow of words. I once told him that it was the dream of my life to appear against him in the Supreme Court because that was the only place where, by the law of the forum, I would get half of the time for talking.

It is also rare for friendship to extend to both families so completely. Each of us felt that we were friends with each of the Bickels, except possibly Punch Bickel, their dog, who likes the way I taste. We were friends with them individually and not just derivatively through Alex. Indeed, our children felt that Alex and Joanne and Francesca and Claudia were our extended family and largely made up for the aunts and uncles and cousins they lacked.

At a time of my own personal tragedy I went to Alex and Joanne and cried out my grief. Later, on a night of good fortune, I went to them and celebrated late. As I left, touched by Alex's unmixed joy for me, I said to him, "In good times and bad times, I come to you first." I had not

realized until I said it that it was true. Without a pause for thought or choice, I always turned to Alex. And he always helped, with sympathy or advice, often with just the right wisecrack.

And now, at the last, I must speak of the manner of his dying. With many friends, one prefers to remember them in full vigor and wipe from mind the memory of the end. Not so with Alex Bickel. The way in which he went to his death will always remain for me and for the others who witnessed it one of the most profoundly moving experiences of our lives. For eleven months he knew that death was the likely outcome; for several of those months he knew it was the inevitable outcome. As soon as he learned what his illness was, he made a conscious resolve to die well. Joanne knew his wish and helped him to achieve it. They supported each other and found support in Francesca and Claudia. I have never seen such courage in a man or a family.

The doctor warned Joanne to expect periods of rage but they never came. What came instead was an intensification of every quality that made us love the man and stand in awe of him. With increasing difficulty in moving, toward the end almost totally paralyzed and blind, he read while he could, listened to reading when he could not, talked of ideas, of people and, unbelievably, tried to comfort his friends. In our frequent telephone conversations and my less frequent visits, it was the same as before, only more concentrated, because now time did not stretch on before us to be squandered.

He outlined the intellectual work he had intended to do, identified the themes, and the authors that had to be studied. As long as he could speak, he could be brought out of himself by an idea floated in conversation and he would take it on, dissect it, put it back together, and trace its linkages to other ideas. I think that helped him; I know it helped us.

He retained to the last his enjoyment of sardonic wit. When the headaches were very bad and the drugs making him drowsy and think-tongued, I would telephone and, before starting a subject, ask, "How is it today, Alex?" He would say, "Not so good. Not so good. But don't worry, I can still take care of you." And I was always relieved to find out, once again, that he could.

On our last visit to New Haven, we talked a long, long time and he spoke about the life he had had and he found it good. He was glad to have the little extra time the doctors could give him with cortisone to talk with his family and friends. Often in pain, unable to move much more than his right arm, unable to see much more than shadows, he said, "These are good days, good days." And he meant it.

Because his life had been happy, he said, he did not mind death. He recalled that when Charles James Fox lay dying he told his wife, "It don't signify. It don't signify." For the first and only time in my presence, and then only for a moment, tears ran down Alex's cheek. And for once Alex was wrong. It does signify, and it will signify—to scholarship, to the nation, and to all who knew him for as many years as are left to us. □



Busing Revisited: The Case of Boston

Last year, this column examined the merits of forced busing to achieve racial balance in the public schools ("The Child as Guinea Pig," *The Alternative*, December 1973). The major themes of that article were first, that what evidence is available suggests that the racial composition of an elementary or secondary school has very little effect on the performance of black schoolchildren; second, that racial tensions in the United States are rooted less in "misunderstandings" than in cultural differences unlikely to be alleviated by thrusting blacks and whites together in the classroom; and third, that busing as a response to *de facto* (as opposed to *de jure*) segregation thus provided at most only some superficial emotional satisfaction to those who naively contend that state-enforced juggling of black-white pupil ratios will somehow "solve" America's racial problems. The article also intimated that forced busing would involve sufficient practical difficulties in an urban community to call into question its efficacy as a governmental policy even if it *did* offer some educational or societal benefits. As one may gather, the conclusion was that we would be well-advised to reject busing as a preferred instrument of social change.

By and large, the federal judiciary is no more impressed by the points I attempted to articulate in my effort for the December 1973 issue than they have ever been. While the Supreme Court has held in the Detroit case that racial balance does not demand busing between separate school systems, within systems busing remains a featured player in the continuing saga of "The Federal Court as School Board." One of the more notable episodes in this drama is currently taking place in Boston, which for the entire 1974-75 school year has been struggling under the impact of a court-ordered desegregation plan involving extensive employment of cross-district busing (issued by the Honorable W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., United States District Judge for the District of Massachusetts). For Boston, it has been a notoriously unpleasant year; indeed, on several occasions events connected (at times peripherally) with the implementation of forced busing have been deemed of sufficient import by the media to warrant national coverage. Accordingly, having witnessed the events of the past few months in the Hub at fairly close range, I thought it

might be worthwhile to return to my former topic—focusing this time not on the efficacy of busing as a vehicle for educational or social progress, but rather, using the case of Boston, on busing as a catalyst for community disruption. Of course, as is true of every individual example, Boston contains unique features which must stand as a caveat to overbroad generalization. In particular, the Massachusetts capital seems characterized by a higher degree of what is popularly known as "ethnic consciousness" than most large urban centers—a factor which has undoubtedly exacerbated some of its present difficulties. Nevertheless, the Boston example seems sufficiently illustrative of the kinds of problems one can expect from implementation of forced busing to warrant recounting the experience.

The most immediately striking feature of that experience has been that busing, which is ultimately supposed to lead to greater racial harmony and social cohesiveness, has rather significantly enhanced the level of racial tension in the Boston area. Specific incidents reflecting this development abound. In the past year, Bostonians have been treated to the spectacle of white students stoning buses carrying black schoolchildren, black students knifing whites in high school corridors, a white mob dragging a black man from his automobile and proceeding to mug him in broad daylight, a number of teenage-gang type altercations between young people of both races, and numerous confrontations, at times bloody in nature, between citizens of all colors and the police. The presence of police units has become commonplace at several area high schools; indeed, for a period of some weeks the situation was sufficiently serious for the governor to mobilize the national guard. Even now, daily pat-down searches of students for weapons are *de rigueur* at a number of locations; to date, the haul has amounted to literally hundreds of knives (regular and switchblade), razors, and other portable implements of destruction, including the occasional small firearm.

Particular incidents of violence and the overall increase in the level of personal danger for the average Boston public school student are, of course, only part of the story of magnified racial tensions. On a more general plane, sizable segments

of the community have become polarized into loosely organized groups over the busing issue, and have engaged in a months-long "dialogue" that reflects little credit to either side. White parents have engaged in several demonstrations which, while perfectly legitimate in themselves, have usually featured much demagogic, inflammatory speechmaking from decidedly unstatesmanlike Boston politicians who seem determined to exploit the disruptive aspects of the current situation for whatever political profit can be obtained. On the other hand, many advocates of the busing program have yielded all too readily to the obvious temptation of labeling their entire opposition as "racist." The most extreme example of the latter phenomenon was a much ballyhooed "March Against Racism," notable mainly for bringing together on historic Boston Commons a group of grizzled veterans of the student demonstrations of the 1960s for a little Sunday afternoon excoriating of the city's blue-collar community. In short, busing, rather than generating serious inquiry into how best to deal with Boston's educational or racial problems, has promoted instead a destructive, unseemly, and often vituperative exchange that serves only to intensify those problems. Indeed, the closest thing to responsible public comment on the issue has been a series of media editorials built around the platitudinous theme of "Now that busing is here, why don't we all forget our personal differences on the issue and pull together to make it work." This is a perfectly unexceptionable little homily as far as it goes, but it has clearly had little impact in reversing the general trend toward greater racial discord.

While increased racial conflict is the most obvious and dramatic by-product of Boston's experiment in forced busing, the impact on the educational effectiveness of the public schools has also been pronounced. Overall attendance figures reveal remarkably high, and remarkably persistent, levels of absenteeism—the average for the year being around 25 percent. In part these figures reflect organized boycotts, mainly by whites, and in part they reflect less political (and probably more legitimate) parental concerns about the safety of their children in the prevailing atmosphere. Whatever the motives, however, the result is the same—large numbers of students have

simply missed most of an entire year of schooling. Similarly, some schools have been closed for weeks at a time because authorities justly doubted their ability to control potential outbreaks of violence within the student body. As a consequence, students at those schools, particularly seniors interested in college, now face the prospect of six-day weeks through the summer if they are to complete minimum requirements. And aside from these more obvious examples of disruption of the educational process, one may well speculate on the negative impact that the tensions of this year have had on the learning progress of even those who have missed not a single day of classes.

Additional effects of busing in Boston—perhaps less drastic but serious nonetheless—are not hard to find. For example, both the city and state have spent literally millions of dollars in regular and overtime pay for police officers needed to hold down violence throughout the year. As this is written, state patrolmen have yet to receive checks for extra work done two months ago, and state government must somehow come up with these additional funds even as it grapples with an overall deficit some four times higher than initial projections. Meanwhile, the neighborhood school concept, long important to the many ethnic communities of Boston, is falling victim to the dictates of court-ordered racial balance. Indeed, Mayor Kevin White has even felt compelled to request the district court to permanently close South Boston High School, alma mater of any number of local public figures, and an important community symbol to much of working-class Boston. And on a more academic and legalistic plane, those who take seriously

such abstract principles as the separation of judicial and legislative powers in the American constitutional system might properly be disturbed by Judge Garrity's recent direction to the Boston School Committee to vote favorably, under penalty of contempt, on particular desegregation proposals.

More evidence could be placed on the record, but I think the point is clear: busing in Boston is fairly described as a



complete mess. One could argue endlessly over whether the white community or the black community or the judge or someone else bears major responsibility for Boston's problems—there is ample support for all positions. Many would contend, for example, that the Boston School Committee has deliberately promoted segregation in its drawing of school districts and its selection of building sites for new school construction. Judge Garrity, on the other hand, has selected the most disruptive means of ending segregation available, despite consistent indications that Boston, black and white, is overwhelmingly opposed to forced busing. (A May 21, 1974 referendum yielded large majorities against busing among citizens of both races, the overall ratio of opposition being 15 to 1; subsequent surveys reveal similar results. See *New York Times*, May 22,

1974, p.18; July 8, 1974, p.22.) To a large degree, however, such questions are irrelevant. In terms of public policy, the point is simply this: if we choose to institute forced busing in our major urban areas (as apparently we have), we may confidently expect to experience the serious social and educational difficulties Boston is encountering today. Perhaps Boston is a severe case; no one can say for sure. But I doubt seriously that Boston is really so much more "racist" or "ethnic" or "violent" or "unstable" or whatever than other cities that its experiences can be dismissed as completely atypical.

Of course, the standard reply of the busing advocate is that while initial difficulties are to be expected, everything will soon smoothe over and we will all be better off. The evidence, however, will no longer permit us to treat this facile answer, no matter how well meaning, as a sufficient response. As I attempted to demonstrate in my earlier column, there are strong indications that busing will do little to advance either educational achievement or social harmony. What Boston should teach us is that *whatever* the ultimate benefits of forced racial balance, the costs of implementing that policy are serious. They cannot be blithely dismissed as mere "initial difficulties"; they cannot be shunted aside as simply the "price of progress." They involve instead educational and social disruption on a scale that few other governmental interferences can hope to match. Recently, the New York State Board of Regents has decided that given that disruption, "racial balance" as a separate goal of educational policy isn't worth the candle. One wonders how many more Bostons must occur before the federal judiciary follows suit. □

Brudnoy's Film Index

The best of 1974...

■ **Amarcord:** Fellini remembers—his boyhood, papa Mussolini, adolescent horny days and nights, the town floozie and the town sage, schoolboy pranks, and the first tentative reachings toward manhood. Earthy, frank, wholly winning, a magical mystery tour of the selective memory.

■ **Chinatown:** Roman Polanski's stunning evocation of 1930s crime thrillers, with Jack Nicholson as a wry private dick, Faye Dunaway as a strange lady, and John Huston as L.A.'s biggest SOB. Murder, political malfeasance, a sprinkling of incest, all the juicy things.

■ **The Godfather, Part II:** Surpasses the

original by a mile, with Al Pacino as the young Don, and Robert de Niro in flashback in the Brando role as Big Daddy on the way up. Over three hours long, but worth every minute; possibly the best examination of syndicate crime in the contemporary movies. For once, a sequel to treasure.

■ **Lacombe, Lucien:** An absolute triumph from Louis Malle. The story of a young French peasant who becomes a collaborator in 1944, finds happiness doing the Nazis' dirty work and more joy with a Jewish girl, then.... Beautifully done, powerfully communicating its message by example, subtly, grippingly.

■ **Murder on the Orient Express:** A superlative Agatha Christie thriller now magnificently filmed, starring everybody,

including Ingrid Bergman cast against type as a drab religious fanatic and Albert Finney as the irrepressible Belgian detective, Hercule Poirot, with Lauren Bacall as Mrs. American Chatterbox, Richard Widmark as the corpse, Tony Perkins as a flaky secretary, Wendy Hiller as a superannuated Russian princess, and on and on. The victim dies of multiple stab wounds, but his train compartment is locked from within. Whodunnit? You'll never guess. A giddy romp, and a train so lovely that you'll know for sure what we've lost in rail transportation since the 1930s.

■ **The Phantom of the Paradise:** a devastating reworking of the Faust story with elements of *Dorian Grey* and the Phantom of the Opera horror rolled into

one, attempting an evisceration of the squalor of the rock 'n' roll industry. Some magnificent effects, moments of breathtakingly original music, and many scenes that are jolting. A triumph of parody.

■ **Scenes from a Marriage:** Ingmar Bergman's investigation of a modern alliance gone quite sour, distilled from a lengthy six-part television series into an awesomely jarring movie starring Liv Ullmann. Not for those whose marriages are on the rocks, this is a sophisticated, icy, phenomenally fine work.

■ **That's Entertainment:** The very best moments from the very best MGM musicals of old. A feast for lovers of old films, good film comedy, and musicals that were, um, musical. And don't tell me that movies are better than ever.

■ **A Woman under the Influence:** The finest American film of 1974, John Cassavetes' unnerving, shattering look at a

wife distraught beyond repair. With Peter Falk and Gena Rowlands as the suffering couple. Come prepared to suffer along with them.

■ **Young Frankenstein:** Mel Brooks' latest mad comedy, starring Gene Wilder as the Frankenstein's grandson ("I pronounce it Fronkensteen; my grandfather was doodoo!"). The ultimate send-off of that enduring old classic. Marty Feldman as good servant Igor, with a movable hump; Cloris Leachman as the weird Frau Blücher, the very mention of whose name frightens the horses; Madeline Kahn as Frankenstein's girl friend; and Peter Boyle as the 7-foot monster with appendages to match.

...and the worst of 1974

■ **The Abdication:** Why, perhaps, Sweden's Queen Christina vacated her chilly throne in 1654 to find happiness as a Catholic lusting after a Vatican cardinal

of the celibate persuasion. Liv Ullmann and Peter Finch, back from their *Lost Horizon* hokum, meander through an endlessly tiresome shebang of philosophical and sexual chatter leading nowhere. One wishes she'd expired in a snowdrift on the way south.

■ **Airport 1975:** A disaster a day keeps the pilots at play. Interminable, witless, unintentionally funny, a clinker with everyone from Moses (Charlton Heston) to the *Exorcist* girl (Linda Blair), plus cross-eyed Karen Black as the stew in a pickle, Helen Reddy as a warbling nun, Sid Caesar as a nervous nelly, Myrna Loy as a lush, and Gloria Swanson as Gloria Swanson, plus your very favorite: the 747, with a big hole in its cockpit. And a good man to fly it is hard to find.

■ **Andy Warhol's Dracula:** Same cast as his occasionally amusing *Frankenstein*, with Joe Dallessandro as the Marx-spouting Italian servant and all those European "discoveries" as the ghouls and drones. Much blood, no humor, no point, no end, no fun at all.

■ **Death Wish:** Charles Bronson's vigilante story, with dialogue your neighborhood idiot could improve upon, acting on a par with the histrionics of the avocado in your fridge, and a do-it-yourself approach to the law that has them in ecstasy at the Birch Society.

■ **Earthquake:** Number 38 of the 1974 disaster flicks, full of outrageous special effects and a cast of zillions (including, again, Moses), with an added thrill: the destruction of Los Angeles. The acting is as heavy as the falling buildings, the loose ends are tied together with epoxy, and I for one wished they had all croaked in the first reel.

■ **For Pete's Sake:** Barbra Streisand's worst film, and that's saying a lot. Incurably cloying "humor," all the oldest, most tedious sight gags, and a plot out of kindergarten.

■ **The Longest Yard:** Burt Reynolds as a noble jailbird, with prisoners you'd love to like if they'd let you, and Eddie Albert as a warden typecast for a prison reform panel's nightmare. One prisoner fries, pity 'twern't all of 'em, and soon.

■ **The Towering Inferno:** When the tallest building on earth catches fire, a veritable galaxy of stars are on hand to be brave, cowardly, dead, and alive. The dialogue is as if meant for chiseling in stone, and the fire does go on, and on.

■ **The Trial of Billy Jack:** How much treacle can the counterculture stomach? They're flocking to this like salmon up the stream. Sanctimoniousness envelopes the film such that you want to retch, idealism is rampant on every shining kiddie puss, and the band plays on. How wonderful is youth! How noble! What a piece of dreck is this!

■ **A Very Natural Thing:** The first attempt at a serious homosexual film, it emerges instead as an unintentionally vapid comedy, with soap opera profundity, and the artsy-fartsy cinematography that *Elvira Madigan* did years ago and we thought had quite had it. This one sets gay lib back a decade.

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Current Wisdom

LEAKS: The flagitious state of civil liberties in France, as reported in the wonderful pages of *Newsweek*:

During Brezhnev's state visit to Paris in early December, many French officials were struck by the visible puffiness of the Soviet leader's face, and inevitably comparisons were made to French President Georges Pompidou's appearance when he was receiving cortisone treatments just before his death from cancer. Upon Brezhnev's departure from Paris, reports began circulating in Washington that French intelligence agents had obtained a sample of a Brezhnev bowel movement, and that by analyzing the excrement the French had concluded the Soviet leader may have cancer.

—*Newsweek*
February 10, 1975

THE HUMAN CONDITION: Another astounding episode in the Tale of India:

A deadlock that jeopardized negotiations to send 300,000 tons of American grain to India has been broken, and India will soon begin to receive the needed food. It remains unclear, however, whether the United States has in return received assurances that the food will be used to feed hungry people in India and not be resold by India to other countries....Indian officials refused to promise not to resell the food, because, they said, it would represent an American intrusion into the decisions of their government.

—*New York Times*
January 12, 1975

WHAT KIND OF MAN READS THE PROGRESSIVE? Public notice found in the incomparable pages of the *Progressive*, where—as a public service—the world is regularly perceived upside down:

Repression: Scores of prisoners in Federal and state penitentiaries across the country are subscribers (or recipients of gift subscriptions) to *The Progressive*. From time to time we learn that prison authorities are interfering with delivery of the magazine. In every case, this "mistake" has been rectified in response to our protest. We want to hear from prisoners, their relatives, and friends, about any attempt to withhold the *Progressive* from its proper recipient.

—*Progressive*
February 1975

THE PRESIDENTIAL FINGERS: Mr. Garry Wills, the body beautiful of American journalism, mercilessly reports on a recent public address delivered by our flabby-fingered President:

The speech was choreographed like a Motown back-up chorus. Each "rising" had an illustrative gesture as if we did not understand basic English. He counted everything off on flabby fat fingers—three fronts, and two elements, and two objectives. (One spectator said, "He'd be in trouble if he had six points.")

—*Bloomington Herald Telephone*
January 25, 1975

THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION: Dr. Frederick C. Thayer, Associate Professor of Public Administration at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, displays the fruits of higher education in this learned communication to the correspondence page of the *New York Times*:

In the Rose Bowl, an Ohio State safetyman, Neal Colzie, intercepted a Southern California pass when Ohio State was threatening to pull far ahead. Colzie ran the ball back inside the 10-yard line, went out of bounds, then spiked the ball. For that act, the Buckeyes were set back to the Southern California 24, and, more to the point, had to score a touchdown for a first down. This put Ohio State in a bad position, the results of the interception were nullified, and Southern California went on from there.

The colleges have apparently taken the position that players are expected to keep the stiff-upper-lip stance traceable to the origins of football in the Ivy League, while the pros have apparently taken the view that "showmanship" is not out of order. Sometimes the college position is defended on grounds that spiking delays the game, but this is nonsense; the changing of teams takes much longer than spiking, and balls are usually changed anyway.

One other aspect of this situation deserves pointed comment. Spiking has, by and large, been initiated by black players, who increasingly dominate the sport. Black culture tends to lead to more demonstrative behavior on the part of players, and for that violators are handed harsh penalties.... It is not too extreme to suggest that the rule itself is a form of racism.

—*New York Times*
January 26, 1975

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY: A flight into the incomprehensible:

The United States is not a middle-class society: over 60 percent work with their hands.

—*New Republic*
January 25, 1975

JOURNALISTS IN FALSE FACE: Deceptive packaging gets an exquisitely sanctimonious rationale in this memorable reply by the editors of *Harper's*, the dedicated nemesis of big business, mountebank politics, and all such bamboozlements of the poor Americano:

The title "How Banks Destroy the Economy" on your January cover was placed above my name without my consent or knowledge. I feel that it misrepresents the content of the article and the style and substance of my work. I request that you print this letter as an apology to the many people who helped me in my work toward a serious book on a serious subject.

Martin Mayer
New York, N.Y.

Harper's takes full responsibility for the title, which happily enlarged the audience for Mr. Mayer's serious article on a serious subject.

—*Harper's*
February 1975

IN HUMAN TERMS: The flaws of Mr. Ford's tax rebate plan as seen by Maudine Cooper of the National Urban League:

Eighty dollars in two installments won't pay the rent for a person's flop-house. It won't buy some wine his wine. And it won't even pay the busfare for a person to pick up his unemployment compensation, if he qualifies.

—National Public Radio
January 30, 1975

VISIONS OF SHELDON: Someone by the name of Sheldon S. Wolin discusses not Russia, not China, not Paraguay, but America, as he sees it. A treat offered only in the prodigious *New York Review of Books*:

This ideology of corporatism and populism serves mainly to conceal that the great power and wealth of the few represent the real price of the material benefits available to the many. It is essential that the many never comprehend that the benefits are the source of their dependence...by the time a student graduates from high school, he or she will on average have been exposed to 350,000 television commercials. Some day, Rousseau wrote, the slaves will rush to put on their chains.

—*New York Review of Books*
February 6, 1975

DEPT. OF COMPARATIVE IDEOLOGY: The fabulous Susan Sontag, live and on stage in the *New York Review*:

Certainly Nazism is "sexier" than communism.

—*New York Review of Books*
February 6, 1975



Correspondence



To The Editor:

I cannot resist writing you to express my admiration and delight at Professor William Nolte's perceptive and eminently just appreciation of Malcolm Muggeridge. As an unreconstructed naturalist I cannot but regard Muggeridge's conversion to transcendental religion as a poetic retreat into fantasy. Like Professor Nolte I believe that the alternatives between "heaven in heaven" and "heaven on earth" are exclusive but far from exhaustive. Even Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich would have agreed with us. But unlike Professor Nolte I regard Malcolm Muggeridge as a human being, as a subtle observer of human nature and conduct, and as a social critic many cuts above the blustering H.L. Mencken, who should be more appropriately compared with Westbrook Pegler. Muggeridge's style has a depth and nuance that Mencken's could never reach; and in marked contrast with Mencken, Muggeridge has no cruelty in him even in the cause of truth. Not that Mencken was always interested in the truth.

Sidney Hook
Stanford, California

To the Editor:

Benjamin Stein's assertion that James Dean is "the most famous Hoosier of the rock generation" (February issue) might be fitting for someone bred in the jungles of New York, the Liechtenstein of America, but it shows how little he knows about either Hoosiers or the rock generation.

The most famous Hoosier of the rock generation is Tom T. Hall of Connersville, Indiana.

W.J. Griffith III
Bean Blossom, Indiana

To the Editor:

I have one comment, which may or may not be useful, on Irving Kristol's stimulating essay on "Republican Virtue vs. Servile Institutions" (February issue). Kristol's description of the "more democracy and less responsibility" trend seems to be valid, but is it enough merely to describe it? How can we explain it? Obviously, as Mr. Kristol observes, we are dealing with attitudes and value orientations that have evolved over time. But why? Perhaps the increasing "bigness" of America and its increasingly impersonal institutions (from churches and schools to corporations) undermines an "individual sense of responsibility" and leads toward collective apathy and mediocrity. For example, no social scientist to my knowledge has studied the consequences (social as well as economic) of the evolution of large corporations, which are more economical and efficient, and the near elimination of family-owned businesses, which are unable to compete. The economic consequences are marvelous for society as a whole, in economic benefits, but may be undesirable in social consequences. There is much integrity, pride, and responsibility that obtains in running a successful family busi-

ness, and the large transfer of this group from independent entrepreneurs to cogs in an efficient corporation may contain the social consequences that Kristol describes. Of course there are other factors, too. Increased mobility and rising expectations in America have, over time, eroded republican virtue and substituted a belief that all must participate equally. I only wish that Mr. Kristol would have taken more of a stab at explanation as well as description.

Bud Folsom
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

To the Editor:

I'm a fan of Banfield, and Wilson. I find the *New York Review of Books* to be inane. Marcuse and the New Left and radical chic arouse my ire. So our prejudices match, yours and mine, and I should be a happy reader. I'm not though; and when a member of your "target population" is mad enough to want to cancel you should pay attention.

The basic problem is your snide attitude toward equal rights for women. Your constant put downs in *Current Wisdom* and the Continuing Crisis have become too much for me. It's fine to poke fun at things like that provided there is also some apparent respect for them otherwise. In the five issues of *The Alternative* I have seen thus far there is only scorn. Your attitude toward racial questions seems very similar. I will not support a publication with so little respect for the fundamental rights of others.

Charles A. Lave
Irvine, California

To the Editor:

In his discussion of Ludwig von Mises' views on Christianity and socialism (February issue), Ralph Raico is quite correct in saying that Christianity has no explicit social doctrine. For that reason, he is quite incorrect in blaming Christianity for the abuses of the various social systems under which it has labored. Ecclesiastical statesmanship, like political statesmanship, requires one to change what evil one can, and to leave unchanged what can be changed only at the cost of tearing the Church asunder. Moreover, remarks such as "Christianity...has practically canonized war..." prove only that Mr. Raico has read neither the Sermon on the Mount nor the Roman Martyrology. Finally, I should like to remind him that the Christian churches have not always been "parasites and oppressors" in the temporal sphere. I point merely to the Catholic Church's vast patronage of art, literature, and scholarship throughout the ages, and the instrumental roles played by Protestant denominations in reform movements such as American Abolitionism.

As to Christianity's relationship with capitalism, I believe there are certain points of intersection between the two, but I must conclude that the differences far outweigh the similarities. Ultimately, *laissez faire* is a

closed social system—as are all social systems. The modern political ideologies—socialism, welfarism, capitalism—are pre-eminently concerned with the things that are Caesar's. They evolve in response to concrete historical situations, and change as those situations change. In other words, they stink of mortality. The Christian, on the other hand, has one eye—only one, to be sure—fixed on the next world, that small, still changeless point around which this world gyrates. The Cross stands atop the peaks which shield the dead strifes and forgotten contentions of the past from the eyes of the living.

I do not deny that Christians take sides—often different ones—on the issues of the moment. But unlike the ideologue, they do so ironically, knowing full well that the Gordian knot of existence cannot be cut by social or political means.

The book of life has closed on Dr. von Mises and all his scholarly successes; the book of history is closing on capitalism and all its economic successes. Time is a master who pays his servants well, but alas, he can only pay them in the wages of time. The Christian dares to ask for more.

And because he dares to ask for more, he can dare to hope.

Paul Strohl, Jr.
Cambridge, Massachusetts

To the Editor:

Quite without realizing it, I'm sure, Mr. Paul E. Reinken has provided *Alternative* readers with an inside look at *Business in America* (December 1974). The theme of his article is not, as its title suggests, a defense of natural monopoly, but a defense of the Bell System's looting of business communications users to offset poor returns on Bell's household markets. I don't credit the phone companies' new competitors or the FCC with any altruistic concern for the free market, but if the phone companies were currently providing their business clients with the cheapest, most efficient service, I doubt that any newcomers would try to compete. Mr. Reinken has identified the business communications market as having "high-profit communications items," and, as far as I can see, his only justification for the phone companies' former monopoly in that market is the low-cost service provided to the households. He claims that those on low and fixed incomes will suffer with high rates and eroded service as a result of the FCC's new rules. The clear implication here is that it is the phone companies' responsibility to serve as a redistributor of income. As a free enterpriser, I find Mr. Reinken's implications and his invocation of "the public interest" as reminiscent of *Atlas Shrugged*.

Mr. Reinken's only valid argument against the new FCC rulings lies in his statement, "They want the right to skim off the dollars in high-profit communications items, but with FCC protection against Bell's counter-competition." Hidden in this statement is the impli-

cation that the FCC will not allow Bell to cut prices against new competitors. Whose fault is that?

Sucking on the public teat must have some sort of stupefying effect, for those who suck the longest seem to believe the collectivist drivel about public interest, fair profit, and greedy businessmen. The phone companies earned their place at the Federal sow by virtue of their self-interest. The other piglets wallowing in the mud for a place at Big Momma will earn it the same way.

Frank Grange
Galt's Gulch, Colorado

To the Editor:

What a pity that Martin Northway's frothy little piece about Jimmy's (The Woodlawn Tap, March 1975) was all bubbles and foam. Aside from the inaccuracies (Jimmy's wasn't even there in 1946, nor yet imagined during the University's "athletic heyday") the profile fails to give a hint of the rich and heady brew that your readers could have tasted. Put it down to Mr. Northway's relatively recent introduction to this shrine to an era when Robert Maynard Hutchins was rounding out his career at the University, a well-known local paper headlined Tom Dewey's defeat of Harry Truman, and Dean Acheson would not "turn his back on Alger Hiss."

Jimmy, of course, came from behind the bar at the U.T., and most of the interesting drinkers followed him to his own place on 55th Street. Bernie and Ralph helped in those days,

and the latter (an ex-Marine) was known to vault the bar occasionally in order to head off an incipient riot when the usual instruments of detente (the Encyclopedia Britannica, complete works of Plato and Aristotle, and other books of reference) failed to pacify the beery antagonists.

It was there, among friends, that the comedy of Ed Asner (Mary Tyler Moore's Mr. Grant), the exquisite raillery of Severn Darden (who drank only milk) and the splendid talent of Fritz Weaver were shaped. Where Jimmy kept a bottle of Old Prerogative (probably the finest bourbon whiskey ever made and never offered for sale) under the bar, and only two of us were allowed to have any. Where Peter Van Doren talked sense and hope into Kevin Rooney, trying to ignore the bullet-grazed forehead (Kevin hanged himself in a New York jail a few years later). And those were the days of Shag Donohue's Red Door, the Twelve Tribes, Nichols and May and Jimmy's famous debate in Mandel Hall defending the virtues of booze against some long forgotten disputant.

There was no one singing "rousing German songs in the front room" (there was only one room, anyway), no "uproarious...fraternity brothers" and few if any university administrators. But those were all things we were happy to do without in those days—over a quarter of a century ago—in this Great American Saloon.

Karl Zimmer
Indianapolis, Indiana

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
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